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Hilario Rivas-Melendrez immigrated to the United States from Mexico when he was 
eleven years old, in 1970, as a lawful permanent resident (LPR).1 In 1980, at age twenty-
one, Rivas-Melendrez was convicted of statutory rape in California after a consensual 
sexual encounter with his seventeen-year-old girlfriend.2 Over the next three decades, he 
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remained in the United States, served in the United States Navy, married another LPR, and 
had four U.S. citizen children.3 In 2009, almost thirty years after his conviction, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated the process to seek his removal from 
the United States based on his 1980 conviction.4 Rivas-Melendrez petitioned for habeas 
relief to the United States District Court, but the judge denied his petition on jurisdictional 
grounds.5 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that, while “remov[ing] a lawful permanent 
resident after 40 years of residency . . . and [] separat[ing] him from his wife and four 
children, is indeed a unique kind of hardship . . . this unique hardship does not translate 
into the kind of restraint needed to meet the ‘in custody’ requirement” for habeas relief.6 
The court sympathized that Rivas-Melendrez’s family ties and three decades of lawful 
residence made his removal a “particularly harsh remedy,” but the court could do nothing 
because he was not in custody when he filed his habeas petition.7 Still, the appellate court 
echoed the concern of the district court, that in “cases like this one, there is effectively no 
remedy for what may have been procedural violations by [Immigration and Custom 
Enforcement] agents and perhaps other immigration officials.”8 Moreover, the court 
appeared to scold DHS for directing its removal efforts at Melendrez—whom the opinion 
described as a “long-time permanent resident, husband, and father of four who has served 
in the military and remained gainfully employed—on the basis of a 30-year-old statutory-
rape conviction.”9 Finally, the court suggested the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
procedures allowed for discretionary reconsideration of Rivas-Melendrez’s claims, and so 
comforted itself that he had “at least one potential avenue for relief.”10 
This story shows that in certain circumstances, options for relief are unavailing. 
Lawful permanent residents who are convicted of a wide range of offenses—from violent 
aggravated felonies all the way down to traffic violations—can be made removable from the 
United States without avenue for relief. As Rivas-Melendrez’s case illustrates, neither 
prosecutorial nor judicial discretionary relief is available, even in such sympathetic situations. 
This Article has two overall objectives. First, it aims to justify why laches, an 
equitable defense that prevents against enforcement of long-held but unused remedies,11 can 
and should be applied against the U.S. government when the government sits on its rights 
and fails to remove a lawful permanent resident for committing a deportable offense in a 
timely manner, after she has served out her sentence. Second, this Article seeks to introduce 
a robust substantive due process right—the right to remain—which undergirds the Court’s 
more recent moves toward greater protection of LPR rights in cases of statutory ambiguity. 
Part II spells out two uncomfortable truths about the U.S. immigration system—that 
it is now easier than ever before to initiate removal proceedings against LPRs, but it is also 
taking longer than ever before to remove them. Part II then lays out the complicated 
                                                           
3 Id. 
4 Joseph Celentino, No Relief Available to Expelled Immigrant, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Aug. 2, 2012), 
https://www.courthousenews.com/no-relief-available-to-expelled-immigrant/. 
5 Id. 
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topography of U.S. immigration law that immigrants must navigate to arrive as LPRs in 
this country and to avoid making any mistakes that could jeopardize their ability to stay 
here. Next, it introduces the popular concept of “crimmigration,” the increasing 
criminalization of immigration violations, and highlights the growing categories of 
offenses, both violent and nonviolent, that can render one removable and explains how 
these categories have ballooned over time. Finally, Part II shows the impact of the 
heightened criminalization on the immigration courts and on LPRs themselves. 
Building on the story of Mr. Rivas-Melendrez, Part III addresses the limited 
discretionary relief options that are available to LPRs at various points in time, including 
statutory cancellation and voluntary departure. It argues that the system is still sweeping 
up far too many nonviolent long-term LPRs, and that discretion—whether exercised by 
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) investigators, ICE 
prosecutors, or immigration judges—is itself too unpredictable a concept for LPRs to pin 
their hopes upon. Instead, Part III suggests laches as a potential relief mechanism for LPRs 
threatened with removal for offenses committed long ago. It explains the contemporary 
understanding of laches and then highlights how laches has been used against the 
government. Finally, this part argues there is a growing body of precedent allowing for the 
application of laches against the government in various areas of immigration. 
Finally, Part IV introduces the substantive due process right to remain. First, it lays 
the foundation that due process rights have long been understood to apply to all persons 
rather than just citizens within the United States. Next, it explains how the right to remain 
flows from an emerging awareness in the courts in three areas: case law limiting alien 
detention during removal proceedings, case law that has barred removals altogether and 
began to consider deportation as something very close to punishment, and case law using 
laches to limit LPR removals. Then, it attempts to also ground the right to remain in our 
shared history and traditions before suggesting several potential implications that could 
come from formally recognizing the right to remain.  
The Article concludes by calling upon immigration scholars and practitioners to help 
champion and continue to develop the right to remain, both through academic and legal 
research, and via legal arguments on behalf of LPRs throughout the country. 
II. TWO UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTHS ABOUT AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
Mr. Melendrez’s tale evinces two uncomfortable truths in the American immigration 
system: it is now easier to deport individuals, including lawful permanent residents 
(LPRs),12 than in recent history, but at the same time it is taking longer and longer to initiate 
deportation proceedings and subsequently deport removable LPRs. Both truths should 
strike us as being unfair. First, the growing list of removable offenses13 raises critical 
questions about the morality of the heightened requirements placed on LPRs, but not on 
citizens. An LPR’s conduct is held to a much higher standard than a citizen, even if the 
LPR has deeper familial, vocational, or economic ties to the United States, because the 
LPR’s consequences for even low-level criminal activity more and more frequently include 
                                                           
12 Although these two problems affect all classes of entrants into the United States from abroad, this Article 
focuses primarily on the immigration treatment and consequences of lawful permanent residents.  
13 See infra Part II(c).  
 





banishment from the United States, after she has served any applicable prison sentence.14 
However, a U.S. citizen who commits a similar or even worse offense than an LPR never 
has to risk a second, permanent incapacitation after serving his prison sentence; once the 
U.S. citizen is released, he may rejoin her family, friends, and potentially employer. 
Second, the lengthy removal process and longer wait times15 create uncertainty for LPRs, 
deny them efficient resolutions to their legal situations, and leave the threat of deportation 
hanging over them for years. The longest of the delayed removal actions also communicate 
another disturbing message: that we as a society believe citizens who have made criminal 
mistakes can be rehabilitated, but LPRs lack that same capacity. 
This Part opens by detailing the process by which aliens get admitted for permanent 
residence into the United States. It then turns to the first of the major truths—the growing 
criminalization of immigration law—and it traces the problems of crimmigration to the 
bloated and unjust definitions of criminal behavior—specifically, what constitutes a “crime 
involving moral turpitude” and an “aggravated felony”—in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA).16 Finally, this Part shows the practical consequences of this 
heightened criminalization by reviewing current removal procedures, highlighting the 
limited role of judicial review, and leading to the second major truth—how much time it 
takes to deport removable individuals. 
A. Admissions Procedures for Prospective LPRs 
The admissions procedures for prospective LPRs are taxing, and the qualifications 
required are high. Individuals who wish to immigrate to the United States and become 
permanent residents can do so through a variety of different methods, with family-
sponsored or employment-based immigration being the most common routes.17 Family-
sponsored permanent residents may enter as “immediate relatives,” a status reserved for 
spouses, children, and in some cases, parents of United States citizens,18 or through four 
family-sponsored preference categories.19 Employment-based slots are reserved for 
                                                           
14 See id.; Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 237(a)(4)(D) (2013) codified as 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(a), Although the INA is codified under various sections of Title 8 of the United States Code, 
this Article refers only to the INA provisions as enacted in the Public Law 
15 See infra Part II(d).  
16 INA § 101(a)(43).  
17 In FY 2013, 990,553 people became LPRs of the United States. Of these, 66% were granted LPR status 
based on a family relationship with a U.S. Citizen or a Permanent Resident, while another 16% entered 
with the backing of an employer. RANDALL MONGER & JAMES YANKAY, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2013 1, 4 (2014).  
18 INA § 201(b)(2)(A). Immediate relatives face the shortest wait time and accounted for 44% of all new 
LPRs in 2013, amounting to 440,000 new entrants in 2013. MONGER & YANKAY, supra note 17, at 2. All 
persons who obtain LPR status based on a marriage that is less than two years old only receive 
“conditional” LPR status and, with certain exceptions, must provide more information to United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) before the two-year mark to lift this conditional status. INA 
§ 216. Exceptions to this conditional two-year check may be granted in cases of extreme hardship, Id. § 
216(c)(4)(A), good faith or not at fault separations, Id. § 216(c)(4)(B), and individuals whose marriages 
ended because they were battered spouses, Id. § 216(c)(4)(C). 
19 There are up to 226,000 slots for four family-sponsored preference categories, typically used by married 
or unmarried adult-age children of U.S. citizens, brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens, or children of current 
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immigrants,20 prioritized by the need for, uniqueness of, and experience and educational 
qualifications of the non-citizen applicant.21 Finally, there are a limited number of 
Diversity Immigrants who come in under a lottery system.22 
Prospective LPRs petitioning from abroad require someone (either a family member 
or an employer) to file a petition with the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Service (USCIS) on the LPR’s behalf.23 Family-sponsored applicants who are not 
immediate relatives, must, at a minimum, wait nearly seven years for their applications to 
become ‘current’ so that USCIS will begin to review them and some employment-based 
beneficiaries abroad also face significant waiting periods.24  
The application procedures are similar for both types of immigrants. For family-
sponsored immigrants abroad, the U.S.-based family member must file a petition with 
proof of the qualifying family relationship, generally in the form of a birth or marriage 
certificate.25 Employment-based immigrants abroad have an additional first step that 
requires employers to file documents with the Department of Labor to either receive (or 
bypass) labor certification, and prove the non-citizen will not take a job for which there are 
qualified American workers available.26 For both types of applicants, once USCIS is 
satisfied the relationship is genuine and meets all legal requirements, it approves the visa 
petition. USCIS then transmits a copy to the consulate in the country the petitioner has 
designated as the place where the non-citizen beneficiary will actually apply for the 
immigrant visa.27 The consular officer then applies the various inadmissibility grounds 
found in the INA that may bar potential LPR applicants from admission into the country.28  
Although the process for application appears to assume that the potential immigrant 
is outside the country, the majority of LPRs gain that legal status through petitions for 
                                                           
LPRs. Id. § 203(a)(2)(b). The various preference allotments are the current figures as of February 2017, 
before any alterations made by the Trump Administration.  
20 There are up to 140,000 slots available annually to four types of employment-based immigrants. Id. § 
201(d)(1)(A). 
21 Id. §§ 204(a), (b). 
22 There are 50,000 spots available in the Diversity Immigrant lottery, Id. §§ 203(c), (e)(2), but high-
admission countries are not eligible for the lottery, and applicants must have a high school diploma or its 
equivalent, as well as two or more years working experience, Id. § 203(c)(2).  
23 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 275 (7th ed. 2012). The American family member or 
prospective employer is the petitioner, while the prospective immigrant is the beneficiary. Id. 
24 Other than FS-2A immigrants (spouses and unmarried minor children of LPRs), the minimum waiting 
period for an LPR applicant abroad, other than coming in as an immediate relative (see above), was nearly 
seven years. In December 2015, for example, the Department of Homeland Security was only then 
accepting for review Visa application that were filed in April 1994 for FS-4 applicants from the 
Philippines, and January 1995 for FS-3 applicants. Non-FS-2A applicants from Mexico faced at least a 
nineteen-year wait for their application to be reviewed. In contrast, most employment-based categories 
were ‘current’—accepting visa applications immediately—other than multiple categories from India 
(seven- to eleven-year wait), the Philippines (four-year wait), and China (two- to seven-year wait). See 
generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, VISA BULLETIN: IMMIGRANT NUMBERS 
FOR FEBRUARY 2017 (2017). 
25 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23. 
26 Id.; INA §§ 204(b), 212(a)(5)(A).  
27 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23. 
28 INA §§ 212(a), 204(b)–205. See infra Part II(b).  
 





adjustment of status while already in the United States.29 Those seeking to adjust their 
status include refugees, asylum-seekers, certain temporary workers, foreign students, 
family members of U.S. citizens and LPRs, and undocumented immigrants.30 Their process 
involves filing an application for adjustment of status to LPR with USCIS.31 Then, the 
USCIS examiner interviews the applicant and applies the same scrutiny and inadmissibility 
grounds that would have been applied by a consular officer abroad.32  
The inadmissibility grounds—the grounds that make someone ineligible for entry or 
adjustment of status—are significant and numerous. INA § 212(a) lists groups of aliens 
who are ineligible to receive visas, making them unqualified to be admitted to the United 
States.33 Categories of inadmissibility cover those who have committed crimes (including 
aggravated felonies and crimes of moral turpitude),34 those who previously entered the 
United States through fraud or willful misrepresentation,35 those who committed prior 
immigration violations,36 those who may become public charges37 or threaten public 
health,38 and those who have been involved in, or have contributed to, terrorist 
organizations.39 Furthermore, INA § 237(a)(1)(A) makes an alien immediately removable 
if she was either technically inadmissible at the time of entry, or at the time she petitioned 
for adjustment of status.40  
If an alien seeking a visa is denied at the consulate in her home country, she has 
limited recourse.41 There are no procedures permitting an applicant to appeal a consular 
visa denial to some higher administrative or judicial authority, outside of very few 
                                                           
29 MONGER & YANKAY, supra note 17, at 2 (finding 53.6% of LPRs received adjustment of status, while 
46.4% were new arrivals to the United States in 2013).  
30 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 512. 
31 Id.  
32 Id.; INA § 245(l)(2).  
33 Id. § 212(a). 
34 Id. § 212(a)(2). 
35 Id. § 212(a)(6)(c).  
36 Id. §§ 212(a)(6), (7), (9), (10) (affecting aliens who illegally entered or had previous immigration 
violations, who have made false claims of American citizenship, who lacked proper documents, or who 
voted unlawfully). INA § 212(a)(9)(A) institutes five- and ten-year bars for noncitizens who have 
previously been ordered removed, and INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) makes inadmissible an alien present in the 
United States who was not admitted or paroled into the country. 
37 Id. § 212(a)(4).  
38 Id. § 212(a)(1).  
39 Id. §§ 212(a)(3)(B), 219.  
40 Id. § 237(a)(1)(A).  
41 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 566. Additionally, cases construing and applying the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (1966) are held to be presumptively reviewable, absent clear 
signals from Congress making review inappropriate. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195 (1993). More 
recently, many circuits have explicitly reaffirmed the general doctrine of non-reviewability. See, e.g., 
Onuchukwu v. Clinton, 408 Fed.App’x. 558 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding consular non-reviewability doctrine 
precludes that circuit’s jurisdiction over challenge to diversity application visa denial); Saavedra Bruno v. 
Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1158–64 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (allowing no judicial review of a challenge filed by a 
foreign national to a denial of visa by an overseas consular official). The Supreme Court most recently held 
that even if a U.S. citizen, whose husband had been denied an immigrant visa by a consular officer, had a 
procedural due process right to an explanation of the grounds for denial of the application, that right was 
satisfied by the grounds given by the consular officer. Kerry v. Din, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2138 (2015). 
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exceptions.42 And the State Department’s internal review procedures are a small comfort: 
the only “review” is a de novo assessment by another officer within the consulate, who 
may then issue the visa in his own name.43  
Technically, a consulate-issued visa only grants the beneficiary the right to come to 
the United States and apply for entry at the border.44 The immigration officer at the port of 
entry assesses the alien’s admissibility by inspecting her entry documents and screening 
her identity against databases.45 If she is stopped here, the alien may receive a secondary 
inspection from another officer.46 At this point, the non-citizen may still withdraw her 
application and return home, at the discretion of the officer.47 If she does not withdraw and 
is still denied entry, she may have a right to a removal hearing before an immigration judge 
(IJ) but she will carry the burden to prove admissibility.48 Finally, aliens rejected either 
without documents, with fraudulent or invalid documents, or who have committed 
immigration fraud in the past may face expedited removal procedures either at ports of 
entry or beyond.49 
B. Introduction to Crimmigration 
In the past two decades, Congress and the courts widely expanded the categories of 
deportable offenses.50 More and more minor offenses are now considered aggravated 
felonies, which mandate removal and a permanent bar on returning to the United States.51 
Underpinning these raw Congressional actions and judicial decisions, Professor Juliet 
Stumpf has traced the change in immigration law from the past practice of merely 
excluding foreigners who had committed past crimes to the present state of affairs, “where 
many immigration violations are themselves defined as criminal offenses and many crimes 
result in deportation.”52 She argues that the merger of criminal law and immigration—
crimmigration—has taken place on three fronts: “(1) the substance of immigration law and 
criminal law increasingly overlaps, (2) immigration enforcement has come to resemble law 
enforcement, and (3) the procedural aspects of prosecuting immigration violations have 
taken on many of the earmarks of criminal procedure.”53 Criminal and immigration law 
                                                           
42 Judicial review of visa revocation is permitted as part of a review of a removal order when visa 
revocation is the sole ground for removability. INA § 221(i).  
43 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 565–66; INA §§ 336(a), 310(c).  
44 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 569. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 INA § 235(a)(4).  
48 Id. § 291. An alien must prove “clearly and beyond doubt” that she is entitled to be admitted. Id. § 
240(c)(2)(A). 
49 Id. § 235(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). Immigration officers retain discretion to allow withdrawal at this point, per 
INA § 235(a)(4), but otherwise judicial review is available only in very limited circumstances—if the 
detained individual claims she was improperly identified or if she claims she is actually already a U.S. 
citizen. Id. §§ 235(b)(1)(C), 242(e)(2). 
50 See infra Part II(c).  
51 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2005) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal 
against an alien who is removable by reason having committed a criminal offenses covered in . . . § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title.”). 
52 Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
367, 380 (2006).  
53 Id. at 381. 
 





began to overlap significantly in the 1980s when Congress proliferated grounds for 
excluding and removing aliens convicted of crimes54 and the overlap continued with the 
passages of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996. At the same 
time, Congress began crafting laws that made immigration violations, themselves, criminal 
acts, subject to criminal penalties.55  
Professor Rachel Rosenbloom, however, has recently argued that crimmigration can 
be traced back to at least the 1960s when the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS)56 used local police arrest records “as a screening device to net deportable non-
citizens.”57 Notwithstanding when the movement began, Professor Stumpf identifies the 
cause of the “crimmigration crisis” as membership theory, “which limits individual rights 
and privileges to the members of a social contract between the government and the 
people.”58 Membership theory, explains Stumpf, manifests in immigration law “through 
two tools of the sovereign state: the power to punish and the power to express moral 
condemnation.”59  
Other scholars have agreed with Stumpf that immigration and criminal law “had 
wrapped themselves together so tightly that it was hard to know where one ended and the 
other began.”60 Professor Hernández noted that crimmigration law was a “product of 
human experience” and “a testament to the United States’ greatest moments and its most 
visceral fears.”61 Importantly, however, because law in general “is perpetually malleable[,] 
[l]egislators, lawyers, and judges can and will continue to shape crimmigration law’s 
reach.”62 
After identifying causes of crimmigration, Professor Stumpf has also explained why 
it is so fundamentally unjust. It hyper-narrowly and solely reviews the moment of the crime 
                                                           
54 Id. at 382–84. Previously, starting in 1917, the United States had only deported non-citizens convicted of 
crimes of moral turpitude, drug trafficking, and limited weapons offenses. Id. at 382–83. 
55 Id. at 384. In 1986, Congress began sanctioning employers for knowingly hiring undocumented workers 
with fines and prison time. Id. Further, since 1990, various immigration violations (marrying to evade 
immigration laws, voting in a federal election as a non-citizen, and falsely claiming citizenship) have been 
made criminal violations, leading to incarceration and subsequent deportation. Id. 
56 The INS was the precursor federal body to the Department of Homeland Security.  
57 Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Policy Sex, Policing Immigrants: What Crimmigration’s Past Can Tell Us About 
Its Present and Future, 104 CAL. L. REV. 149, 155 (2016). Indeed, Rosenbloom sees the 1963 case of 
George Fleuti (Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)), in which the Supreme Court held an LPR living 
in California was entitled to return to the United States after a brief visit to Mexico, not as a case of entry 
controls at the U.S. border, but rather as one about interior removal of LPRs who committed at-the-time 
illegal acts. Id. at 153–54.  
58 Stumpf, supra note 52, at 377.  
59 Id. at 378.  
60 César Cuauhtémoc Garcia Hernández, The Life of Crimmigration Law, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 697, 697 
(2015). See also Allison S. Hartry, Gendering Crimmigration; The Intersection of Gender, Immigration, 
and the Criminal Justice System, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 7–11 (2012) (outlining the history 
and build-up of “crimmigration”); Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75, 80 
(2013) (defining the “crimmigration complex” as the expanding array of government agencies and private 
contractors using the threat of criminal sanctions to enforce civil immigration law). 
61 Garcia Hernández, supra note 60, at 698. 
62 Id. 
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that made the non-citizen removable.63 That one-strike approach, however, or, as Stumpf 
calls it, the “extraordinary focus on the moment of the crime,” stands in stark contrast to 
how we treat the criminal missteps of citizens: citizens get the benefit of their whole life’s 
work before the judge decides whether to mitigate or, sometimes, enhance their 
sentences.64 Furthermore, Stumpf shows the real impact that crimmigration has, beyond a 
growing case backlog. She notes that it has resulted in “an ever-expanding population of 
the excluded and alienated,” and that “excluding and alienating a population with strong 
ties to family, communities, and business interests in the United States fractures our society 
in ways that extend well beyond the immediate deportation or state-imposed criminal 
penalty.”65 
C. The Expansion of Removable Offenses 
Once they arrive and are admitted into the United States, LPRs still remain in the 
country at the pleasure of the government, and may be removed for a variety of reasons, 
which include conduct occurring prior to their entry,66 being excludable at the time of 
entry,67 and conduct occurring after a lawful entry.68 Beyond being physically separated 
from friends, family, and often their means of work, removed non-citizens face significant 
re-entry bars of five or ten years, though the bar can be longer depending on the individual’s 
circumstances.69 More significantly, subsequent re-entry without permission is a criminal 
offense, subject to imprisonment for up to twenty years depending on the grounds for the 
resident alien’s initial removal.70 
Removable conduct occurring after a lawful entry includes many crime-related 
grounds, as defined in INA § 237(a)(2). This subsection will discuss three main 
categories—crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and public charge—
and how the expansion of these categories has led to unprecedented numbers of removals 
in the last twenty years. In sum, LPRs are at risk of removal based on crimes that are 
significantly less severe than the INA-advertised felony-level threshold.71 Nonviolent and 
traffic-based offenses can and have resulted in significant numbers of removals, and these 
numbers (and proportions) are growing.72 These offenses, additionally, can hang over 
LPRs’ heads for decades.73 
                                                           
63 See Juliet Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 
1709–10 (2011). 
64 Id. at 1705, 1709–10. 
65 Stumpf, supra note 52, at 378.  
66 INA § 237(a)(1)(A).  
67 Id. § 237(a)(2)(A). For instance, someone may have been inadmissible but may have gotten through the 
consular process.  
68 Id. § 237(a)(4)(D).  
69 Id. § 212(a)(9)(A).  
70 Id.  
71 See infra Part II(c).  
72 See infra note 133 and accompanying text. MARC ROSENBLUM & KRISTEN MCCABE, MIGRATION POLICY 
INST., DEPORTATION AND DISCRETION: REVIEWING THE RECORD AND OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 13 (2014), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Deportation-Discretion-Report.pdf (stating 
that in 2008, FBI-nonviolent, drug possession, traffic, and nuisance crimes were the basis of 43,957 
removals, and that number increased to 72,781 removals in 2013).  
73 IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., supra note 1, at 4.  
 





One of the most capacious categories is the “crime involving moral turpitude” 
(CIMT). Non-citizens convicted of a CIMT within five years of admission into the United 
States are removable.74 Never affirmatively defined in the INA, a CIMT has been defined 
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)75 as an “act which is per se morally 
reprehensible and intrinsically wrong, or malum in se, so it is the nature of the act itself 
and not the statutory prohibition of it which” makes it a CIMT.76 The Fifth Circuit, 
however, approved of a different BIA definition that defines moral turpitude as “conduct 
that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary 
to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in 
general.”77 Other circuits have applied similar definitions.78 CIMTs may involve intent to 
defraud, to commit theft with intent to permanently deprive, or intent to inflict great bodily 
harm; but they also include serious crimes against persons, like murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, rape, aggravated assault, and kidnapping; and crimes against property like 
arson, burglary, or embezzlement.79 Two or more crimes of moral turpitude after admission 
automatically render an alien removable, regardless of the dates of conviction or the length 
of her sentence.80 
Coupled with the vagueness of the moral turpitude definition is the expansive 
definition of “conviction” in use by ICE.81 The CIMT removal category is contested by 
disagreeing courts and results in a patchwork application across the country, increasing 
uncertainty and unfairness for LPRs.82 For instance, the Fifth Circuit recently held that 
                                                           
74 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i).  
75 The BIA sits within the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and 
is the country’s highest administrative body for interpreting and applying immigration laws, and reviews 
decisions of administrative immigration judges (“IJs.”) Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).  
76 In re Fualaau, 21 I. & N. Dec. 475, 477 (B.I.A. 1996). 
77 Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 
1989). Most BIA decisions may be appealed, by either the government or the petitioner, up to the Circuit 
Court of Appeals in which the petitioner resides. Board of Immigration Appeals, supra note 75; see also 
Appeals, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/immigration/appeals/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2017).  
78 See, e.g., Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 103 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d 
Cir. 2005)) (explaining that moral turpitude captures conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved”); 
De Leon-Reynoso v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633, 636 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th 
ed. 1999)) (defining moral turpitude as something “contrary to justice, honesty, or morality”). 
79 IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., § N.7 CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE 111 (2013), 
http://www.ilrc.org/files/documents/n.7-crimes_involving_moral_turpitude.pdf; See also ALEINIKOFF ET 
AL., supra note 23, at 694. 
80 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
81 The definition of conviction is broader than one may think, and it includes a guilty verdict or a nolo 
contendre plea. INA § 101(a)(48)(A)(i). Suspended sentences count as part of the ICE’s calculation of an 
LPR’s length of imprisonment, and reversals on appeal do not count to expunge the conviction or reduce 
the sentence length for ICE’s purposes if the reversals were made specifically to avoid immigration 
consequences of the conviction. Id. § 101(a)(48)(B). Furthermore, while a pardon generally eliminates all 
immigration consequences for convictions, pardons do not affect removability or lessen re-entry bars for 
crimes of domestic violence or substance abuse. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 698. 
82 See, e.g., Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that crimes involving moral 
turpitude required conduct that was “inherently base, vile, or depraved”); Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 263 
(2d Cir. 2000) (requiring a “corrupt scienter” as the “touchstone of moral turpitude”); Partyka v. Attorney 
Gen. of the U.S., 417 F.3d 408, 414 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that a “hallmark of moral turpitude” was a 
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misuse of a Social Security number counted as a crime involving moral turpitude,83 while 
the Ninth Circuit explicitly disagreed.84 The Ninth Circuit also bucked with other circuit 
courts when it held that accessory after the fact did not count as a crime involving moral 
turpitude.85 Most recently, the Third Circuit grappled with how to determine if LPRs 
convicted of state-law offenses had, in fact, committed CIMTs (as defined in the federal 
Immigration and Nationality Act).86 Finally, while CIMTs generally require baseless or 
vile action, there is currently a circuit split over whether driving under the influence is a 
crime of moral turpitude.87 In addition to rendering an LPR removable, these vaguely 
defined offenses also bar LPRs from cancellation of removal—a form of discretionary 
relief that could otherwise let removable aliens remain in the country.88 
The expansion of the CIMT category raises a key issue integral to the rule of law: 
notice. Non-citizens are not adequately warned about what makes them deportable, as the 
definition is vague and variable. The Supreme Court did address this issue in Jordan v. 
DeGeorge,89 and upheld CIMTs over a void for vagueness challenge.90 And recently, the 
Second Circuit upheld an INA provision rendering deportable any alien convicted of 
stalking over a void for vagueness challenge.91 However, the Seventh Circuit remanded a 
decision to the BIA when it could not determine whether falsely using a Social Security 
number constituted a crime involving moral turpitude and, if so, whether LPRs could be 
expected to know this.92 There, Judge Posner remarked in his concurring opinion that “[t]he 
concept of moral turpitude, in all its vagueness, rife with contradiction, a fossil, an 
embarrassment to a modern legal system, continues to do its dirty work.”93 And, as 
discussed above, courts commonly split over the same issues arising in different circuits, 
begging the question of whether Congress may provide a more consistent solution for 
interpreting when a CIMT is implicated in a defendant-LPR’s conduct.94 Indeed, if 
                                                           
“reprehensible act committed with an appreciable level of consciousness of deliberation”); INA § 
237(a)(2)(A)(i).  
83 Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388, 392 (5th Cir. 2007). 
84 Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2000). 
85 See Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzalez, 503 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2007). But see, e.g., Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 
1213 (11th Cir. 2002), and Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2005) (both holding that accessory 
after the fact is a crime involving moral turpitude). 
86 Jean-Louis v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 468 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding state-law reckless 
assault of a minor, without more, did not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude for INA purposes 
because the state statute defendant was convicted under encompassed broader actions than the federal 
definition).  
87 See Keungne v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1288 (11th Cir. 2009); Marmolejo-Campos v. 
Gonzales, 503 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that a DUI was a crime involving moral turpitude 
under INA § 237(A)(2)(a)(ii)); but see Knapik, 384 F.3d at 93 (holding defendant’s attempted reckless 
endangerment from a DUI is not a crime involving moral turpitude).  
88 Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1, 11 
(2014); See infra Part III. 
89 341 U.S. 223 (1951). 
90 Id. at 703. 
91 Arriaga v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2008).  
92 Arias v. Lynch, 934 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 2016). 
93 Id. at 835 (Posner, J., concurring).  
94 See infra notes 83–85 (Hyder, 506 F.3d at 392; Navarro, 503 F.3d at 1063; Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 
1179); but see Padilla, 397 F.3d at 1016, and Itani, 298 F.3d at 1213 (both holding that accessory after the 
 





Congress fails to act, then perhaps a challenge to DeGeorge may be appropriate now, as 
the Supreme Court has shown a renewed interest in taking up “void for vagueness” 
challenges.95  
In addition to being convicted of a CIMT, committing an aggravated felony at any 
time after admission will also put an alien at risk of removal.96 Although courts have 
expanded the definition of CIMT, the meaning of “aggravated felony” has been stretched 
and broadened by Congress, itself. The term “aggravated felony” was first introduced in 
the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act and applied specifically to immigrants and asylum 
seekers.97 It was originally limited to serious crimes like murder and drug trafficking, but 
was most significantly expanded in two 1996 laws—AEDPA and IIRIRA.98 The term 
“aggravated felony” now covers more than twenty categories of offenses and includes all 
crimes of violence for which punishment is over one year imprisonment.99 An aggravated 
felony conviction, as defined in the INA, also makes the alien ineligible for most forms of 
relief from removal, including asylum,100 cancellation of removal,101 or voluntary 
departure,102 and she is also barred for life from re-entry without special consent from the 
Attorney General.103 
The bar for what counts as an aggravated felony has been lowered considerably, and 
the INA’s definition has grown to include less serious offenses; courts have interpreted 
“aggravated felony” under the INA expansively to include misdemeanors and less serious 
offenses than those explicitly defined in 101(a)(43).104 A growing number of smaller 
offenses now count as aggravated felonies; a category that began with murder, rape, sexual 
abuse of minors, and drug trafficking now includes firearm possession, theft, and 
burglary.105 Other notable examples “aggravated felonies” include any drug or firearm 
trafficking convictions, regardless of sentence length,106 entry without inspection (EWI) 
                                                           
fact is a crime involving moral turpitude); See Keungne, 561 F.3d at 1288; Marmolejo-Campos, 503 F.3d at 
927.  
95 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (holding the term “violent felony” in the 
Armed Career Criminal Act sentencing enhancement law was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, 
violated Due Process). 
96 INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). 




99 Id.; INA § 101(a)(43).  
100 Id. § 208(b)(2)(B)(i).  
101 Id. § 240A(a)(3).  
102 Id. § 240B(a).  
103 Id. § 212(a)(9)(A).  
104 United States v. Ramirez, 731 F.3d 351, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 
F.3d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 2002).  
105 Aaron Lang, Note, An Opportunity for Change? Aggravated Felonies in Immigration Proceedings and 
the Effect of Moncrieffe v. Holder, 33 B.U. INT'L L.J. 101, 120 n.148–49 (2015) (citing RICHARD S. STEEL, 
STEEL ON IMMIGRATION 508–15 (2013)); see also INA § 101(a)(43). Some additional crimes, such as 
domestic violence offenses, while frequently overlapping with CIMT and aggravated felony grounds for 
removal, also explicitly make a noncitizen removable. Id. § 237(a)(2)(E).  
106 Id. § 101(a)(43)(B)–(C).  
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after previously being removed,107 failure to appear for a sentence or before a court,108 
counterfeiting or forgery,109 and any obstruction of justice or perjury.110 What’s more, non-
citizens who are removable on aggravated felony grounds are not eligible for most forms 
of judicial discretionary relief, regardless of their ties in the United States or the time that 
has passed since their offense.111 
Roland Sylvain’s case is illustrative of this expansion: ten years before his arrest by 
ICE, Sylvain, a Haitian native who had arrived legally in the United States with his family 
when he was seven years old, received a speeding ticket in Virginia.112 At the time he had 
signed the ticket with the name of his cousin, who was with him in the car, but then 
panicked and immediately confessed to the highway patrolman.113 Sylvain was charged 
with forging public records and received two suspended sentences for a total of three years 
that he never had to serve.114 He never had any trouble with the law afterwards, but he 
nonetheless faced imminent deportation.115 
The power of the “aggravated felony” category may be fading soon however. In 
September 2016, the Tenth Circuit held the INA’s definition of “aggravated felony” was 
unconstitutionally vague because it included 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)’s definition of “crime of 
violence.”116 The Tenth Circuit ruled that because the Supreme Court held the Armed 
Career Criminal Act’s residual definition of “violent felony” was void for vagueness in 
Johnson v. United States,117 the incorporation of “crime of violence” into the INA’s 
definition of an “aggravated felony” was likewise too vague.118 The Supreme Court has 
not yet granted certiorari, however, so for now the “aggravated felony” removal grounds 
stand.119 
Next, any controlled substance possession now also makes a lawful permanent 
resident or an undocumented alien removable120 and, as noted above, the immigration 
consequences for these convictions do not disappear even after full pardons.121 Non-
citizens are removable for most drug offenses, including for being a drug abuser or addict, 
even in the absence of an underlying criminal conviction.122 With one exception (for 
possession thirty grams or less of marijuana for personal use), this provision applies 
                                                           
107 Id. § 101(a)(43)(O).  
108 See id. § 101(a)(43)(Q)–(T). 
109 See id. § 101(a)(43)(R).  
110 See id. § 101(a)(43)(S).  
111 See Cade, supra note 88, at 6, 10.  
112 See Ercolani, supra note 97. 
113 See id.  
114 Id. 
115 Christie Thompson, Deporting ‘Felons, Not Families’, MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 21, 2014), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/11/21/deporting-felons-not-families#.jEpI1JR9d. 
116 Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1067 (10th Cir. 2016). 
117 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). 
118 Golicov, 837 F.3d at 1067 (granting petitioner’s petition for review, vacating his order of removal, and 
remanding the case to the BIA). 
119 See id., petition for cert. filed, Sessions v. Golicov (U.S. Feb. 2, 2017) (No. 16-966). 
120 Id. See INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i). 
121 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 698. 
122 See Thompson, supra note 115.  
 





extraterritorially, threatening to remove LPRs for violating the drug laws of any country 
they visit.123  
Finally, in rare cases aliens may even be removed for being a “public charge”—a 
drain on public government resources—from “causes not affirmatively shown to have 
arisen since entry.”124 President Donald Trump has signaled this removal category may be 
used more aggressively by his administration, as he issued a draft executive order that 
would exclude LPR-hopefuls who may require public assistance and deport LPRs and other 
non-citizens in the U.S who rely on social services help.125 This prioritization would starkly 
contrast with the policies of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, which 
scaled back the “public charge” deportation rules.126  
These factors have led to more deportations than ever before. In 2013, the United 
States removed nearly 440,000 individuals from the United States, the most ever in a single 
fiscal year.127 Of those, 198,000 were removed for criminal convictions.128 Approximately 
136,000 of those aliens were removed for non-immigration criminal offenses—that is, for 
crimes that did not have to do with actual illegal entry or re-entry into the United States.129 
By 2016, those figures rose to 450,954 removals and returns, although the government 
formally initiated new enforcement actions—apprehensions, after-the-fact inadmissibility 
determinations, and ICE arrests—against 805,071 individuals.130 
 Since 2008, each year has seen a greater number of less and nonviolent offenders 
removed than aggravated felons or multiple-time felony offenders.131 Marc Rosenblum and 
Kristen McCabe concluded that “[w]hile criminals account for a growing share of 
                                                           
123 Id. 
124 INA § 237(a)(5). 
125 Andrew Bremberg, Memorandum for the President: Executive Order on Protecting Taxpayer Resources 
by Ensuring our Immigration Laws Promote Accountability and Responsibility, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 23, 
2017), http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/draft-executive-orders-on-immigration/2315/. 
See also Abigail Hauslohner & Janell Ross, Trump Administration Circulates More Draft Immigration 





126 Janell Ross, Trump Draft Executive Order Full of Sound and Fury on Immigration, Welfare and 
Deportation, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/02/02/trump-draft-executive-order-full-of-sound-and-fury-on-immigration-welfare-and-
deportation/?utm_term=.bd0157f4113d. In 1999, the Clinton administration edited the public charge law to 
ensure participation in food aid programs, medical care, job training, education, and childcare would not 
constitute “public dependency.” Id. Then, in 2002, the Bush Administration guided immigrant children 
could receive food aid during the existing five-year waiting period for LPR adults to be eligible for most 
aid programs. Id. Finally, since 2009 states have been able to provide independent health care coverage to 
legal immigrant children and pregnant women in their first years in the United States. Id. 
127 JOHN F. SIMANSKI, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 1 (2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf.  
128 Id. at 9. 
129 Id. 
130 DHS Releases End of Year Fiscal Year 2016 Statistics, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/12/30/dhs-releases-end-year-fiscal-year-2016-statistics.  
131 ROSENBLUM & MCCABE, supra note 72, at 13.  
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removals, a sizeable share of those removed are not the most serious criminals.132 Indeed, 
the percent of nonviolent (e.g., drug possession, nuisance, and traffic-based)133 removals 
has grown from 14% of all removals in 2008 to 16% in 2013, representing an absolute 
increase of 29,000 annual removals.134 Finally, Syracuse University’s TRAC Immigration 
Project has also found that the percent of removals based on alleged criminal activity has 
fallen each year since 2010, to its lowest level ever in 2016.135 More than ever before, DHS, 
through its enforcement arm, ICE, has been focusing on removing nonviolent non-citizen 
offenders. Furthermore, in contrast to the prioritization categories for removal issued by 
the Obama administration,136 the Trump administration plans to remove any alien who has 
been convicted of, charged with, or committed acts that constitute any criminal offense.137  
Finally, the rising list of crimes that make an LPR removable, even ten or twenty 
years after their commission, also make the LPR inadmissible and, therefore, permanently 
ineligible for naturalization. Indeed, in 2013, of the 13.14 million immigrants in the United 
States, 4.35 million were not eligible to naturalize.138 Committing a removable offense can 
serve as a permanent bar to naturalization because of the INA’s good moral character 
requirement139—the same aggravated felony that may render an LPR removable at any 
                                                           
132 Id. at 12. 
133 FBI-designated nonviolent crimes (excluding drug, traffic, domestic abuse, and nuisance offenses) 
included fraud and shoplifting. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States, 2011: Offense 
Definitions, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/offense-
definitions (last visited Apr. 11, 2017).  
134 ROSENBLUM & MCCABE, supra note 72, at 13 (showing that in 2008, FBI-nonviolent, drug possession, 
traffic, and nuisance crimes were the basis of 47,869 removals). That number increased to 72,781 removals 
in 2013. Id. 
135 Nature of Charge in New Filings Seeking Removal Orders through February 2017, TRAC REPORTS, 
INC., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/apprep_newfiling_charge.php (last visited Mar. 28, 
2017). 
136 See infra Part III(a) for more discussion about prosecutorial discretion and its pending changes. 
137 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan et al., Acting 
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. 2 (Feb. 20, 2017) (available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-
to-Serve-the-National-Interest.pdf). The revised version of the memorandum (released Feb. 20 rather than 
Feb. 17), does note the heads of ICE, CBP, or USCIS may issue further guidance to prioritize 
enforcement—for instance, by prioritizing removal of convicted felons, or aliens involved in gang activity 
or drug trafficking. Id. However, ICE arrests in the first months of 2017 indicate the Trump Administration 
has not yet established any prioritization schemes: from January through mid-March, ICE arrested 21,362 
immigrants—compared to 16,104 in the same period in 2016—and “[a]rrests of immigrants with no 
criminal records more than doubled to 5,441.” Maria Sacchetti, ICE immigration arrests of noncriminals 
double under Trump, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration-
arrests-of-noncriminals-double-under-trump/2017/04/16/98a2f1e2-2096-11e7-be2a-
3a1fb24d4671_story.html?utm_term=.08d4b0160908.  
138 BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 
2013 3 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_lpr_pe_2013_0.pdf.  
139 Though the INA does not explicitly define “good moral character,” it lists acts that evince a lack of good 
moral character, and includes references to most criminal offenses, crimes involving moral turpitude, and 
crimes involving controlled substances. INA §§ 101(f)(3), 316(e), 212(a)(2). 
 





time after her admission into the United States140 also serves to permanently disqualify her 
because it would violate the good moral character naturalization requirement.141  
D. A More Crowded Immigration Court 
The increase in removal actions due to the congressional and judicial broadening of 
removal definitions as well as other identified factors has led to a significantly more 
crowded immigration court. The number of pending deportation cases in immigration 
courts has increased each year since 2006.142 The number of cases has grown from 174,935 
in 2007 to 533,909 in the last decade.143 California, alone, has nearly 97,000 deportation 
cases as of the start of 2017, while immigration courts in Texas and New York have almost 
95,000 and 73,000, respectively.144  
A short review of removal procedures is necessary to understand the context for this 
backlog. The removal process begins when the DHS serves a charging document, called a 
Notice to Appear (NTA), to an alien either in person or by mail, which commands a hearing 
before an IJ at a designated time and place.145 Generally, NTAs afford DHS the power to 
arrest an LPR who does not attend her hearing, but ICE officers may also serve the notice 
to an LPR in person with an accompanying custodial arrest.146 The hearing must be 
scheduled at least ten days after service, though it can stretch to as far as three years from 
the receipt of the NTA.147 Respondents in removal proceedings must pay for their own 
counsel148 and may usually receive one or two continuances, typically to seek counsel.149 
Indigent respondents must be informed of free legal services in the area if they cannot 
afford counsel.150 After either the arrest or the individual hearing, the DHS officer 
examines the case and determines if and what bond will be made available. The respondent 
may then obtain review of the bond decision from an IJ at a bond redetermination 
hearing.151 
The arrest itself may be warrantless.152 Specifically, immigration officers may arrest 
without a warrant any alien who the officer believes is either entering or attempting to enter 
the United States in violation of immigration laws, or is present in the United States in 
                                                           
140 Id. § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
141 Id. §§ 316(a), 101(a)(43), 101(f)(8). INA § 101(f)(8) excludes from naturalization anyone who “at any 
time has been convicted of an aggravated felony,” and, as mentioned before, aggravated felonies include 
not just murder, rape, and sexual abuse, but also money laundering, perjury, failure to appear for 
sentencing, and failure to appear before a court. Id. § 101(a)(43).  
142 Backlog of Pending Cases in Immigration Courts as of February 2017, SYRACUSE UNIV.: TRAC, 
http://trac.syr.edu/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2017). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 1148; INA § 239. More commonly, though not the scope of this 
paper, an alien is not served with an NTA because she is picked up near land borders and agrees to a quick 
return to Canada or Mexico (after fingerprinting). Id. at 1149. 
146 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 1148-49. 
147 Id. at 1148. 
148 Id. at Ch. 10 Sec. A. 2 at 1150; INA § 240(b)(4)(A). 
149 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 1148. 
150 Id. at Ch. 10 Sec. A. 2 at 1150; INA § 239(b)(2). 
151 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 23, at 1149. 
152 INA § 236(a).  
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violation of immigration laws and is likely to escape before a proper warrant can be 
obtained.153 In these cases, the alien is also brought before another immigration officer and 
if this agent believes there is a prima facie case against the alien, formal removal 
proceedings are initiated.154 
The first judiciary involvement occurs at the master calendar hearing (the subject of 
the NTA), which determines whether an individual merits hearing is even required, based 
on whether the individual admits the allegations and waives relief or whether she chooses 
to dispute the facts, contest her removability, or seek asylum or another form of relief.155 
If it is required, the IJ sets the individual merits hearing for some date in the future. The 
alien may then appeal to the BIA and, from there, to the United States Appellate Courts.156 
Beyond asking for review of the decision, aliens may file, generally within ninety days, up 
to one motion to reopen to offer previously unavailable material evidence157 or, within 
thirty days, a motion to reconsider based on claimed errors in an earlier appraisal of the 
law or the facts of the case.158 Importantly, however, these motions do not automatically 
stay the execution of removal orders unless the alien filed a motion to reopen an in absentia 
order.159 Furthermore, if the removal order was made in absentia, (around 15% of all IJ 
decisions), the non-citizen ordered removed is ineligible for any discretionary relief for ten 
years, though there are some allowances for rescission and equitable tolling.160 In total, 
LPRs’ appeals aim for two types of relief: either a hearing and grant of some sort of 
statutory relief provided by a judge, or favorable prosecutorial discretion exercised by 
DHS. These, along with one other kind of discretion, are discussed in the next Part.161 
As a result of higher volumes in immigration courts, individuals threatened with 
removal have had to wait longer and longer for their cases to be heard and resolved. The 
average wait time to hear a removal case has increased from 406 days in 2006 to 672 days 
in 2016—a 66% increase.162 However, the wait time to hear a removal case brought for a 
criminal, national security, or terrorism removal ground has gone up from 353 days in 2006 
to 822 days in 2016—a 133% increase.163 In California, criminal-based removal cases 
languish for an average of 964 days before they are heard by a judge, and in Texas 
individuals have to wait an average of 1,007 days.164 Once they were heard, by 2016 these 
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14, 2016). 
161 See infra Part III. 
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cases took another 571 days, on average, to be resolved (up from 228 days in 2006—a 
150% increase), and the process took significantly longer in California (739 days) and New 
York (902 days).165 Cases that ended in removal—a presumably more straight-forward 
procedure—have also felt the brunt of the processing backlog, stretching from 131 average 
processing days in 2006 to 353 processing days in 2016—a 169% increase.166 And, the 
processing backlog has been more pronounced for individuals who were awarded 
discretionary relief (599 days in 2006 versus 880 days in 2016—a 47% increase) and who 
could prove there were no actual grounds for their removal (373 days in 2006 versus 500 
days in 2016—a 34% increase).167 
Furthermore, among individuals who were removed from the interior (not at the 
border), 51% of their qualifying convictions occurred more than a year before their ICE 
apprehension, and 25% were more than five years old.168 Though roughly 66% of these 
five-year-or-more delayed removals were based on violent crimes (which likely involved 
lengthy prison sentences), more than 30% of these long-delayed removals were for 
nonviolent crimes, drug possession, traffic, or nuisance crimes.169 Overall, nearly four 
thousand removal events occurred between 2003 and 2013 on the basis of a traffic or 
nuisance crime that was more than five years old.170 
 These immense delays present serious ethical problems. There is something 
morally suspect about holding the threat of removal—banishment from one’s family, 
friends, jobs, home, and livelihood—over an LPR for years after she serves the applicable 
prison sentence for the crime that has rendered her removable. Although presumably she 
has paid her debt to our society with her time in jail, she is now left to linger and wait in 
an uncertain immigration status.171 Many LPRs, like Mr. Melendrez and Mr. Sylvain, upon 
their release have no further contact with DHS or ICE for years, and are left to believe their 
debts were properly paid. They create more connections in this country—meet and marry 
significant others, raise families, rise in their careers, and become Americans—until they 
are suddenly ripped away from them. U.S. citizens can rest comfortably, by simple virtue 
of their birth or naturalization, in knowing that once they serve their sentence they may 
rejoin their communities. By setting limits on prison sentences, we express the belief that 
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171 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
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gratuitous, and a kind of over-punishment that risks individuals disrespecting or de-legitimizing the law. 
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citizens who stepped afoul of the law may be rehabilitated. However, the current 
immigration regime unjustly refuses to extend that faith to LPRs—residents who often 
have ties that are as strong or stronger to the United States than comparable citizens. In 
2003, Javier Licón was cited for a DUI, went to court, spent three nights in jail, and took 
remedial DUI classes.172 Five years later he met and then married an American citizen, 
Sherrie Soria.173 As a citizen, if Ms. Soria was caught committing the same crime, either 
ten years ago or two weeks ago, then she would simply pay the same fine and spend the 
same three days in jail as Mr. Licón. Her punishment would be complete and her crime 
atoned for.174 Mr. Licón, however, risks the threat of removal—banishment—from his 
wife, his friends, and his job. Keren Zwick, managing lawyer for the National Immigrant 
Justice Center in Chicago, summarized it bluntly: “Whether an offense happened thirty 
years, ten years, one day ago, there is no difference in the system” for LPRs.175 She 
summarized the current situation, remarking that “[w]e are deporting generally good 
people and we will continue to deport generally good people.”176 
III. LACHES CAN PROTECT LPRS WHERE DISCRETION FAILS 
As demonstrated, the situation faced by long-term resident aliens suddenly charged 
as removable for a crime (violent or nonviolent) committed many years ago remains bleak. 
Courts currently offer LPRs limited avenues for relief, and some resort to encouraging 
LPRs to seek favorable discretion from prosecuting officials.177 This discretion, however, 
is exercised by different parties at different times and can be divided into two categories: 
prosecutorial discretion and relief discretion. This Part reviews the current potential 
avenues for relief and explains why they are inadequate as practical solutions or, often, 
completely unavailable to the LPR in question. It will show that current statutorily provided 
discretion is not only insufficiently broad, but that in fact discretion waivers are applicable 
to a smaller and smaller cohort of LPRs. Ultimately both prosecutorial and relief discretion 
are unable to provide the equitable remedies required for the grave moral violations 
outlined in Part II.  
 The remedy that remains—laches—is underexplored in this context. Although it is 
an old, equitable relief mechanism, laches may and has been used in the past to bar actions 
of the federal government. Furthermore, there is a growing body of precedent allowing for 
the application of laches against the government in various areas of immigration.  
A. Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion are Insufficient Solutions to Crimmigration 
and Long-Delayed Removal Actions 
Two popular solutions to the increased volume of removal actions and the growing 
backlog of immigration cases call for increased prosecutorial and judicial discretion. ICE 
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prosecutors, proponents contend, should serve as a safety valve and decline to prosecute or 
enforce removal of LPRs on a case-by-case basis. Judges, in turn, should act as secondary 
stop-gaps to prevent LPRs like Mr. Sylvain or Mr. Melendrez from being removed from 
their families, friends, and homes. Discretion, however, is inherently ad hoc and may come 
with painful and politically unpalatable consequences. A brief review of the various 
discretion options may help explain the varied application of these two tools. 
1. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Prosecutorial discretion is more wide-ranging than relief discretion. At many stages 
of the removal process, the government (prosecutor) may exercise varying degrees of 
discretion.178 Perhaps the most critical decision is whether to charge the individual in the 
first place, and for how long to pursue removal charges against an individual who has 
committed a removable offense. Thus, when I refer to prosecutorial discretion, I mean the 
decision at “Time Zero” made by ICE officials to file an NTA against an LPR or not. There 
are far more removable individuals than the government has the resources to deport, so 
prosecutorial discretion is a response to this backlog—an attempt to make the best use of 
limited government resources. In theory, ICE and DHS prosecutors could choose not to 
prosecute an LPR for a minor crime, or to drop the charges if the LPR has been a 
longstanding and productive participant in her community. 
The justification for relying on prosecutorial discretion is the “flexibility” that a case-
by-case approach can engender.179 Law professor Jason Cade argues that discretion allows 
“the complexity of an individual’s situation” to be taken into account to “avoid an overly 
harsh application of statutory law.”180 At bottom, the problem is the poor drafting and 
sledgehammer approach of the INA; its “categorical[] and unforgiving approach thus 
elevates the role of enforcement discretion, which must compensate for the statute’s lack 
of nuance.”181  
In fact, Cade argues ICE prosecutors, who “decide whether to pursue removal, which 
charges to levy, what trial tactics to employ, and whether to appeal adverse decisions in 
hundreds of thousands of cases . . . every year,” have a duty, rooted in statutory provisions, 
case law, and agency guidance, to exercise their discretion in the interest of justice.182 Other 
commentators agree, arguing for extending case-by-case discretionary analysis and judicial 
review, especially for LPRs who could show “significant contributions to their community, 
as well as other mitigating factors.”183 Aaron Lang has explained, “[i]f the LPR has not 
conclusively committed a crime deserving of removal, mandatory removal under the 
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current . . . felony regime finds no logical or moral justification.”184 More discretionary 
review would let ICE prosecutors consider other mitigating factors before they issue 
NTAs.185 However, Lang does not explain how a prosecutor could determine what crimes 
conclusively deserve removal. Discretion, therefore, appears to stand on a foundation of 
more discretion.  
Based on early guidance, prosecutorial discretion in the new administration does not 
look like it will be used in the way that this Article believes it should be. Previously, the 
Obama Administration had explicitly codified its prosecutorial discretion guidance to ICE 
officers by creating three distinct “priority” categories for removal in the November 2014 
Johnson Memorandum.186 Even under the Obama Administration’s prioritization program, 
however, LPRs could still have been removed for crimes like a DUI, simple assault, or 
even shoplifting that results in just a single-year suspended sentence.187 The Trump 
Administration has repealed the Johnson Memo and replaced it with a new scheme that 
rejects “exempt[ing] classes of removable aliens from potential enforcement.”188 Instead, 
the Kelly Memorandum appears to prioritize all removable aliens:  
Department personnel should prioritize removable aliens who: (1) have 
been convicted of any criminal offense; (2) have been charged with any 
criminal offense that has not been resolved; (3) have committed acts which 
constitute a chargeable criminal offense; (4) have engaged in fraud or 
willful misrepresentation in connection with any official matter before a 
governmental agency; (5) have abused any program related to receipt of 
public benefits; (6) are subject to a final order of removal but have not 
complied with their legal obligation to depart the United States; or (7) in the 
judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose a risk to public safety 
or national security.189 
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Of particular concern is the guidance to remove aliens who have not been convicted 
of or even charged with criminal offenses. The final version of the memo does add that the 
heads of ICE, CBP, or USCIS may issue subsequent prioritization guidance, but it does not 
provide any kind of hierarchy among removable individuals.190 
Today, ICE is a very flat and tightly controlled organization.191 It is the second largest 
criminal investigative agency in the U.S. government, behind only the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation,192 with over 20,000 employees and an annual budget of $6 billion.193 ICE 
describes its field officers as being rigorously trained to “investigate, identify and arrest 
those who not only came here unlawfully, but who turned to a life of crime and don’t want 
to be caught, such as gang members, drug dealers and violent criminals.” 194 Now, though, 
with no prioritization hierarchy, ICE agents enjoy more freedom to target wider alien 
populations.195 A ten-year ICE veteran noted, “[b]efore, we used to be told, ‘You can’t 
arrest those people [aliens with low-level felony or misdemeanor convictions, or no 
criminal histories at all],’ and we’d be disciplined for being insubordinate if we did . . .. 
Now those people are priorities again.”196 Although the Obama Administration’s priorities 
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hierarchy required agents to focus on deporting gang members and other violent and 
serious criminals, the new guidelines were aimed, as White House Press Secretary Sean 
Spicer explained, to “take the shackles off” of ICE agents.197 
2. Relief Discretion 
In contrast to prosecutorial discretion, relief discretion can be provided by two 
parties: either ICE or the immigration courts. First, relief may come in the form of a 
decision by the ICE prosecutor, after issuing the notice to appear, to suspend the agency’s 
prosecution of an individual LPR. Until 1996, immigration prosecutors explicitly did have 
discretion when dealing with LPRs charged with aggravated felonies, and could halt 
removal proceedings based on the nature of the offense, the length of the immigrant’s 
residence in the United States, evidence of rehabilitation, or the hardship faced by the non-
citizen’s family, though only if these factors were brought to the prosecutor’s attention.198 
The 1996 AEDPA and IIRIRA reforms, however, eliminated many cases of discretionary 
waivers and discretionary relief from removal.199 Today, ICE officers have limited relief 
discretion; their enforcement guidelines remain bound to the INA, whose expansive 
definitions “Aggravated Felony” and “Crime involving Moral Turpitude” capture many 
more offenses than the terms were originally designed for.200  
Under the current enforcement preference memorandum, relief discretion that relies 
on prosecutors fails to provide consistent and predictable equitable relief. The Kelly Memo 
includes a catch-all category to prioritize the removal of any alien who “in the judgment of 
an immigration officer, otherwise pose[s] a risk to public safety or national security.”201 
The Kelly Memo also guides that prosecutorial discretion “shall be made on a case-by-case 
basis,” by the appropriate head of the field office that would initiate the enforcement 
action.202 By explicitly turning away from known categories, the newly encouraged form 
of discretion is ripe for personal bias and arbitrariness to creep in.  
Secondly, relief discretion may come in the form of an immigration or appellate 
judge’s decision to rule in the immigrant’s favor in the face of significant legal and factual 
hurdles. Even after being set for removal, an alien may still petition for limited relief 
options. The first of these options is statutory cancellation of removal, which allows the 
judge to permanently cancel the removal order based on discretionary balancing that 
considers the amount of time the LPR has spent in the United States, the LPR’s family ties, 
employment history, property or business ties, value and service to community, and proof 
of genuine rehabilitation if a criminal record exists.203 A favorable exercise of this 
discretion is not easy to achieve: individuals charged as removable for committing a loosely 
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defined aggravated felony are not eligible for statutory cancellation of removal at all.204 
Prior to 1996, all LPRs could take advantage of the above-described generous former INA 
§ 212(c) relief, which allowed LPRs to seek waivers of exclusion grounds if they had seven 
years lawful domicile in the United States and could show countervailing equities to the IJ 
when seeking relief from deportation, even in cases of criminal convictions.205 However, 
this option was repealed by IIRIRA.206 
For other removable LPRs, INA § 240A(a) allows them to seek waivers of exclusion 
grounds if they resided in the United States for seven years after lawful entry and were an 
LPR for at least five of those years,207 but these waivers are not granted as a matter of 
course, and they are still prohibited for any LPRs who have been convicted of an 
“aggravated felony.”208 There is tremendous variation in the degree to which judges use 
discretion. As of February 27, 2017, immigration judges had granted relief in 8.1% of all 
removal cases nationwide, but this ranged from 3.1% in Arizona and 3.6% in Texas up to 
20.7% in New York.209 Controlling for location, variation within a state is also significant: 
in California, just 3% of judges in Los Angeles granted judicial relief, while 5.6% of San 
Diego and 16.5% of San Francisco judges did so.210 The variety is even more pronounced 
in asylum cases: for example, in New York City, Judge Terry Bain approved 94.5% of 
asylum applicants from October 2005 through May 2011, while Judge Alan Vomacka, in 
the same court, accepted only 28.3% of applicants he had seen.211 
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Discussing the fact that roughly 50% of applications for discretionary relief by LPRs 
from 2003–2013 were granted, law professor and immigration scholar, Daniel Kanstroom, 
notes that this shows the “immigration court system is completely overwhelmed.”212 
Kanstroom was the first modern writer to propose various structural changes, including a 
potential known and publicized statute of limitations, as a “more efficient, cheaper, and 
fairer” solution.213 Even Jason Cade admits that excessive workloads lead as often to 
“prosecutorial inattention” as they do to prosecutorial discretion.214 Their observations bear 
out in the numbers: Federal immigration judges, who must share clerks, hear up to 1,500 
cases per year, and the average claim in front of an IJ lasts only seven minutes.215 Adding 
to the difficulty of presenting a coherent case on behalf of a long-standing LPR, attorneys 
in the field may represent up to 300 individual immigrant clients annually and these clients 
often must present their cases to the judge through a language barrier and over a video 
screen while being detained in facilities hundreds of miles from the courthouses.216  
More commonly, aliens who are set for removal choose to petition instead for 
voluntary departure, which grants them up to 120 days to leave the country and allows 
them to avoid a formal removal order that would, itself, trigger a ten-year inadmissibility 
bar on returning to the United States.217 Once more, though, this option is not available to 
individuals who ICE seeks to remove on the basis of an aggravated felony.218 Moreover, it 
is an inadequate solution as it requires LPRs to formally depart the country and leave their 
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217 INA §§ 240B, 212(a)(9)(A). Voluntary departure is not available for anyone deemed removable for an 
aggravated felony, regardless of the sentence, or on terrorism-related grounds. Id. § 240B(a). Voluntary 
departure benefits are structured as a sliding scale, depending on when in the removal process the alien 
petitions for this discretionary relief. Id. § 240B(a)(2). If the alien requests to leave voluntarily before being 
subject to removal proceedings, she may get up to 120 days to do so. Id. There are more stringent limits on 
voluntary departure, however, if the alien petitions only after the conclusion of removal proceedings. Id. To 
merit voluntary departure relief at that stage, the alien must have been physically present in the United 
States for at least one year before receiving the NTA, show good moral character for at least the preceding 
five years, pay a departure bond sufficient to ensure she is leaving, and show she has the means and intent 
to depart the country. Id. § 240B(b).  
218 Id. § 240B(a)(1).  
 





families, loved ones, and jobs behind. It does not, in fact, provide immediate relief from 
removal but is rather like a plea bargain. 
 A system relying solely on the backstop of discretion—either from an ICE 
prosecutor or a judge—falls victim to traps inherent to all discretionary relief mechanisms 
in the law: arbitrariness, favoritism, and conscious and unconscious biases.219 Scholars and 
activists Wade Henderson and Nancy Zirkin of the Leadership Conference on Human and 
Civil Rights suggested alternate forms of discretion, including having programs apply to 
all of DHS rather than just ICE, providing advance timeframes to the discretionary grants, 
treating some discretion requests in groups to ensure more fairness for affected individuals, 
and creating a review process at DHS Headquarters to ensure compliance with department-
wide discretionary programs.220 However, this Article suggests a role for an older form of 
equitable relief. 
B. Laches Is Available as a Mechanism for Relief for LPRs 
Laches, or “staleness of demand” is a defense in equity,221 and the concept is based 
on the maxim that “equity aids only the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.”222 
This Article suggests laches is available as a remedy for LPRs who face long-delayed 
removal actions. To this end, this Section introduces the relief mechanism of laches, and 
then shows the ways it has been used to bar actions of the federal government. Next, it 
reviews more recent court decisions, in which judges have expressed a greater willingness 
to use laches to protect LPRs against federal immigration actions.  
The doctrine of laches is rooted in “the injustice which might result from the 
enforcement of long-neglected rights.”223 It is based not only on the concept of time 
passing, but also on changes in the conditions involved with the claim—whether certain 
witnesses can still recall enough to effectively and honestly present evidence for or against 
the defendant.224 Laches penalizes “knowing inaction” by a party with a legal right by 
preventing that party from enforcing that right after such a long amount of time has passed 
that prejudice has resulted to the other parties.225 The doctrine is not just useful to shake 
off delayed charges; rather, what is more important for our purpose is that the right to 
                                                           
219 See generally Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise 
of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795 (2012), for a review of implicit bias research and 
how it can impact the decisions of prosecutors. See also Madison Burga & Angelina Lerma, The Use of 
Prosecutorial Discretion in the Immigration Context after the 2013 ICE Directive: Families Are Still Being 
Torn Apart, 42 W. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 25 (2015), for a discussion of prosecutorial discretion in immigration 
law and its limitations.  
220 Wade Henderson & Nancy Zirkin, Letter to President Obama Re: Immigration Enforcement, 
LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.civilrights.org/advocacy/letters/2014/letter-to-president-obama-re.html.  
221 30A C.J.S. Equity § 138 (2015). 
222 Id. See also Chattanoga Mfg., Inc. v. Nike, 301 F.3d 789, 792 (7th Cir. 2002); Miller v. Glenn Miller 
Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 997 (9th Cir. 2006). Section 3527 of the California Civil Code codifies the 
maxim, providing “[t]he law helps the vigilant, before those who sleep on their rights.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3527 (West 2015). 
223 30A C.J.S. Equity § 138 (2015); See also McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 656 F. Supp. 1200, 1202 
(C.D. Ill. 1987).  
224 30A C.J.S. Equity § 138 (2015). 
225 L.V. v. R.S., 788 A.2d 881, 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
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enforce an order of court may be lost through laches.226 Laches is an affirmative defense 
to a prosecutor’s charge or a plaintiff’s allegation and, as such, the burden of proof lies 
with the defendant.227 The defendant must prove the affirmative defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.228  
A laches defense has two elements. First, there must be an “unreasonable delay in 
assessing one’s rights.”229 Second, one has to show “a resulting prejudice to the defending 
party.”230 Both elements must be proven because the injury, prejudice, occurs only at the 
second prong.231 The Tenth Circuit has noted that the most important question is “whether 
the assertion of the plaintiffs’ cause has, through lapse of time considered with the 
circumstances and nature of the alleged cause, become unconscionable and, if allowed to 
prevail, would constitute an injustice to defendants.”232  
Although they often serve the same purpose and have similar underlying rationales, 
laches is distinct from statutes of limitations.233 Laches originated in equity in situations 
lacking a statutory time limit on prosecution234 and has thus existed independent of statutes 
of limitations.235 Rather, the concept functioned as a “flexible” common law statute of 
limitations, serving to limit long-delayed claims where there was no statute of limitations 
specifically made available.236  
In the past, laches had not been widely used against actions taken by the federal 
government, and when it was applied, it was done so narrowly.237 In 1961, in Costello v. 
United States,238 the Court summarized the state of the law at the time: “[i]t has consistently 
been held in the lower courts that delay which might support a defense of laches in ordinary 
equitable proceedings between private litigants will not bar a denaturalization proceeding 
brought by the Government.”239 In Costello, the Court denied the defendant’s argument 
that laches should have precluded the U.S. government from bringing denaturalization 
proceedings against him twenty-seven years after he engaged in illegal bootlegging 
                                                           
226 Trapp v. Schaefer, 30 A.2d 287, 289 (N.J. Ch. 1943) (“The doctrine of laches is based on the injustice 
that might result from the enforcement of long neglected rights.”).  
227 LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Dublin Residential Cmtys. Corp., 785 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).  
228 Id. 
229 Brown-Graves Co. v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 206 F.3d 680, 684 (6th Cir. 2000). 
230 Id. 
231 Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190, 195 (6th Cir. 1992). 
232 Hunt v. Pick, 240 F.2d 782, 785 (10th Cir. 1957) (emphasis added). 
233 Enforcement of Statutes of Limitations shows that courts are willing to adopt the codification of laches-
based rationales. For example, Congress has specified a twenty-year statute of limitations for art theft, ten 
years for arson and some crimes against financial institutions, and eight years for nonviolent violations of 
terrorism-associated statutes. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTES OF LIMITATION IN 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31253.pdf. While a 
widespread immigration enforcement statute of limitations is possible, it is not practical under current 
congressional deadlock conditions and is not the goal of this Article. 
234 30A C.J.S. Equity § 138 (2015). 
235 Id. 
236 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(4) (2d ed. 1993). 
237 Embassy Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. D.C. Mayor’s Agent for Historic Pres., 944 A.2d 1036, 1049 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
238 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961).  
239 Id. 
 





activities.240 Indeed, the Court generalized that “laches is not a defense against the 
sovereign”241 because the public should not be injured or suffer losses due to the 
“negligence of public officers.”242 This case set the hurdle that any laches claim against the 
government would need to clear in the future, and it was interpreted in this way by the 
Sixth Circuit, which held that “[t]he ancient rule quod nullum tempus occurit regi—‘that 
the sovereign is exempt from the consequences of its laches . . .’ has enjoyed continuing 
vitality for centuries.”243 
However, the Supreme Court itself cast doubt on that interpretation as early as 1977 
in a case addressing the validity of an individual’s defense against long-delayed federal 
agency charges.244 In Occidental Life, the Court held that courts could step in if the 
defendants would be “significantly handicapped” in making their defenses due to 
“inordinate” delays by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal 
agency, in filing actions against them.245 The Court went on to explain the same 
discretionary power, rooted in laches, “‘to locate a just result in light of the circumstances 
peculiar to the case’ can also be exercised when the EEOC is the plaintiff.”246 Seven years 
later, the Court again questioned the finality and scope of Costello, when it held that it was 
“still an open question whether, in some future case, ‘affirmative misconduct’ on the part 
of the Government might be grounds for an estoppel.”247  
At the appellate level, the tide also appears to be turning in favor of a legitimate rule 
of reason review, rather than a per se blanket ban on the use of laches against the U.S. 
government.248 In 1985, the Federal Circuit ruled a government contractor could argue that 
the government’s efforts to obtain a refund of its money were barred by laches in S.E.R. 
Jobs For Progress Inc. v. United States.249 Two district courts then used the S.E.R. decision 
to consider the availability of laches as a defense in student loan debt collection cases.250 
In 1986, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Kairys,251 commenting on the Costello 
decision, painted the Court’s proclamation in Costello as dicta, explaining that while “[t]he 
[Costello] Court noted that the lower courts had consistently disapproved of the use of 
laches in denaturalization proceedings . . . [t]he [Costello] Court went on to hold that in 
                                                           
240 Id. at 288.  
241 Id. at 281. 
242 Id. (quoting United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 (D. Mass. 1821)).  
243 United States v. Peoples Household Furnishings, Inc., 75 F.3d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1996); See also United 
States v. Weintraub, 613 F.2d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that it is well established that the 
Government is generally exempt for the consequences of its laches). 
244 Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372–73 (1977).  
245 Id. at 373. 
246 Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975) (quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 
U.S. 531, 541 (1931))).  
247 Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 67 (1984) (citing INS v. Hibi, 414 
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248 S.E.R., Jobs For Progress, Inc. v. United States, 759 F.2d 1 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
249 Id. at 1, 8–9.  
250 United States v. Zue, 704 F. Supp. 535, 537 (D. Vt. 1988) (denying application of laches to a student 
loan debt collection based on a factual analysis that conditions for laches had not occurred); but see United 
States v. Rhodes, 788 F. Supp. 339, 343 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (applying laches to bar government collection 
of student loan).  
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any event the defendant had not adequately demonstrated prejudice.”252 Subsequently, the 
Third Circuit agreed, and interpreted the Costello decision to leave on the table the question 
of whether laches were available against the sovereign.253  
In Costello . . . the Supreme Court acknowledged that some federal courts 
have held that “laches is not a defense against the sovereign,” but because 
the Court concluded that the laches claim in that case would fail on its 
merits, it did not decide whether the defense was applicable in a 
denaturalization proceeding.254 
By 1990, in appropriate circumstances, the Seventh Circuit wrote that it long believed 
laches could preclude suits brought by the federal government.255 In P*I*E Nationwide, 
Judge Richard Posner wrote that “[f]ollowing dictum in Occidental Life [] and the general 
principle noted earlier that government suits in equity are subject to the principles of equity, 
laches is generally and we think correctly assumed to be applicable to suits by government 
agencies as well as by private parties.” 256 Then, in 2005, the Second Circuit explained that 
while “the United States has traditionally not been subject to the defense of laches . . . this 
does not seem to be a per se rule.”257 Two years later, the Ninth Circuit also came down in 
favor of the possibility of laches in United States v. Dang.258 The Ninth Circuit concluded, 
“Costello reserved judgment on the applicability of the [laches] defense to a 
denaturalization action.”259 In the case at bar, Dang had failed to prove “lack of diligence,” 
a requisite element of a laches defense.260 However, the laches defense was not foreclosed 
to a theoretical defendant who could make out the necessary second prong of the common 
law laches defense.261  
More recent decisions further suggest that there may, indeed, be room for laches in 
combating removal actions.262 In 2012, the Third Circuit admitted that it had not yet 
“addressed whether the defense of laches is available in a removal proceeding.”263 And 
though the Sixth Circuit, in Haddad v. United States,264 ultimately denied the defendant’s 
laches defense, it did so not because that defense was entirely unavailable, but because the 
defendant could not establish the requisite “prejudice” element.265 Currently, the key for a 
defendant appears to be an elemental analysis with an admittedly high bar that he must 
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254 Id. at 445 (quoting Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961)).  
255 See NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 893–94 (7th Cir. 1990). 
256 Id. at 894 (citing EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
257 Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 278 (2d Cir. 2005). 
258 488 F.3d 1135, 1144 (9th Cir. 2007). 
259 Id.  
260 Id. 
261 See id. 
262 See, e.g., Williams v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 458 F.App’x 148 (3d Cir. 2012). 
263 Id. at 151.  
264 486 F.App’x 517 (6th Cir. 2012). 
265 Id. at 520. 
 





clear, which comes from the old elements of laches—showing (1) a lack of diligence by 
the federal government and also (2) resulting prejudice to the defendant.266 
Opponents to using a laches defense against the federal government in removal 
actions may point to congressionally set statutes of limitations in other areas of 
immigration, such as naturalization fraud and passport fraud.267 This could present an issue 
where laches and a statute of limitations could conflict. The Fourth Circuit observed that 
“laches is a judicially created doctrine, whereas statutes of limitations are legislative 
enactments.”268 And, when laches conflicts with a statute of limitations, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held, “or where the equitable cause of action is analogous to one at law, 
laches may depend solely on the comparable statute of limitations.”269 Thus, the statute of 
limitations would generally guide a court’s use of laches if the two concepts cover the same 
act at issue.270  
However, “where there has been an unreasonable delay, laches has been applied to 
defeat a claim despite the fact that the time fixed by the comparable statute of limitations 
has not passed.”271 In 1944, Justice Owen Roberts explained that “[s]tatutes of limitation, 
like the equitable doctrine of laches . . . are designed to promote justice by preventing 
surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence 
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”272 The Court, 
summarizing its rationale, explained “the right to be free from stale claims in time comes 
to prevail over the right to prosecute them.”273 Furthermore, even LPRs who did commit 
naturalization or passport fraud, while no longer subject to criminal prosecution for these 
crimes after ten years, may still face the threat of removal for their entire lives after 
committing a removable offense, especially since convictions are not required for removal 
prioritization under the new Kelly Memorandum.274 Finally, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that there are political process breakdowns and has previously stepped in to 
fashion quasi-equitable remedies in immigration issues before.275 
                                                           
266 See Santana Prods. Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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removal order and fashioning a new requirement that counsel must inform a client if the client’s plea 
carries a risk of deportation, based on Sixth Amendment precedent, the seriousness of deportation, and the 
impact of deportation on families living in the United States lawfully).  
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In fact, the suggestion for a time-bar on removal has roots going back over sixty 
years. The 1953 Presidential Immigration Commission recommended a general ten-year 
statute of limitations for any lawful immigrant.276 The Commission reasoned “it is wrong 
to keep the threat of punishment indefinitely over the head of one who breaks the law,” and 
found that this “is a principle deeply rooted in the ancient traditions of our legal system.”277 
Where statutes of limitations are lacking, federal courts have already begun to at least 
consider the availability of laches as another means of protection against a lifetime of 
unrest and worry for affected LPRs. 
Laches is, admittedly, a second-best remedy because it only addresses the second 
uncomfortable truth—the delay issue—and not the first—the increased criminalization—
of our immigration system. A more impactful remedy would be a more robust due process 
right, which could protect long-time LPRs from both crimmigration and its resulting 
removal backlog. This right is discussed in the last Part. 
IV. A NASCENT RIGHT TO REMAIN 
Although laches is the only remedy currently available that could help LPRs, there is 
hope on the horizon. In Part II, this Article identified two ethical challenges in immigration—
it is now easier to deport people than before, and it is taking longer to do so.278 Part III offered 
a partial response to the second problem by explaining how the doctrine of laches could be 
applied against the federal government’s enforcement of long-delayed removal actions. In 
Part IV, this Article suggests a possible resolution of both major problems that lawful 
permanent residents face by using a new substantive due process right—the right to remain. 
The right to remain not only would preclude the government from seeking removal years 
after a removable offense, but also would provide many other protections for LPRs to protect 
against unjust deportations for minor or noncriminal offenses. 
This Part opens by explaining that Due Process rights are not, and for over a hundred 
years have not been, reserved strictly for U.S. citizens. As a result, substantive due process 
rights could and should be made available to LPRs. Next, it formally introduces the right 
to remain as a substantive due process right.279 It reviews recent case law to show that the 
recognition of this right has been building through an emerging awareness of it in the 
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courts,280 both in cases involving removal and in those focused solely on detention. Third, 
it also attempts to ground the right in our shared national history and traditions.281 This Part 
will end by discussing implications of a right to remain and calling upon immigration 
scholars to help fully identify and develop it as a substantive due process right, and on 
practitioners to further test it in courts. The right to remain can then combat the inequities 
LPRs currently face under our immigration system when they are held to a wire-thin 
standard of conduct and then face those pressures for an uncertain and currently unlimited 
amount of time.  
A. Applying Due Process to Non-Citizens 
The concept and rights associated with due process can and have been granted to 
lawful permanent residents and other non-citizens within the United States. The Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, “ . . . nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”282 Although privileges and 
immunities of only citizens are expressly protected, due process (and equal protection) is 
guaranteed to all persons within the United States’ jurisdiction.283 The Fifth Amendment, 
passed as part of the Bill of Rights, also extends due process protections based on 
personhood rather than only citizenship.284 Specifically, it provides “nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”285 As applied against both the states and 
the federal government, due process rights are not reserved to citizens but are instead 
granted, at a minimum, to those persons within the government’s territorial jurisdiction.286 
There is a long history of applying Due Process to LPRs and other non-citizens in 
this country. Over 120 years ago, the Supreme Court held the Due Process Clause protected 
aliens who were subject to a final order of removal.287 The reason for this, the Court has 
stated, is the need for fairness: “[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even 
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of 
fairness encompassed in due process of law.”288 Indeed, the notion of fairness is especially 
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important for “aliens whose roots may have become . . . deeply fixed in this land.”289 The 
Supreme Court observed as much in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,290 holding “[t]he Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens.”291 Rather, its 
“provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction 
. . . .”292 And, in the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court held it is “well established 
that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation 
proceedings.”293 Most recently, in 2001, in Zadvydas v. Davis,294 the Court explained “once 
an alien enters the country, the legal circumstances change, for the Due Process Clause 
applies to all “persons” within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence 
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”295  
This modern conception of due process for aliens follows a territorial line of 
demarcation first illustrated in two dissents from the Supreme Court’s 1893 opinion in 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States.296 There, a Chinese laborer was removed from the United 
States, where he had lived and worked for several years, because he failed to find a white 
witness to certify that he had resided in the United States lawfully.297 The majority opinion 
upheld both the 1892 Exclusion Act’s deportation of unlawful Chinese laborers and also 
the Act’s requirement that all Chinese laborers in the United States had to procure a 
“certificate of residence” from a revenue collector.298  
Although the 1886 Yick Wo decision had only purported to apply to the states rather 
than the federal government, two justices built upon the importance of personhood rather 
than citizenship in their dissents in Fong Yue Ting seven years later. First, Justice David J. 
Brewer presented a textual argument, maintaining “[i]f the use of the word ‘person’ in the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects all individuals lawfully within the State, the use of the 
same word ‘person’ in the Fifth must be equally comprehensive . . . .”299 To this end, 
Brewer proposed to extend personhood protections to limit actions taken by the federal as 
well as state governments.300 
Second in dissent, Justice Stephen J. Field argued for a strict territorial approach that 
was rooted in fairness: “[t]he moment any human being from a country at peace with us 
comes within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . he becomes subject to all their laws, 
is amenable to their punishment and entitled to their protection.”301 Justice Field’s dissent 
focused almost exclusively on territoriality: at the moment an individual enters U.S. 
territory, she becomes entitled to more protections. Field grounded this rights-extension in 
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two beliefs. First, although legal alien residents could not vote or hold public office, “as 
men having our common humanity, they are [still] protected by all the guaranties of the 
Constitution.”302 Second, because foreigners and citizens were equally subject to the laws 
of the United States and any prohibitions therein, foreigners must be afforded similar 
procedural protections and privileges as were provided to citizens.303 To fail to do this 
“would be to establish a pure, simple, undisguised despotism and tyranny with respect to 
foreigners resident in the country by its consent, and such an exercise of power is not 
permissible under our Constitution.”304 Field supported his due process extension on 
territoriality and the familiar concept of fairness—when one is subject to the United States’ 
rules, regardless of citizenship, she should receive some protections in turn. These 
decisions thus far have been viewed as landmarks of providing procedural due process to 
resident aliens. However, when they are viewed in concert with more recent Supreme and 
Appellate Court decisions about the length of pre-removal detention and deportation as 
punishment, one may recognize the Court is crafting a different right altogether. In the 
cases that follow, by prodding DHS (and its predecessor, the INS) for more favorable 
exercises of discretion on behalf of aliens, and through its growing body of precedent 
gradually extending more protections to LPRs, the Supreme Court has been providing more 
remedies to non-citizens with a significant stake in the United States, but without 
articulating the right that holds these remedies together.305 
B. An Emerging Awareness? 
Writing for the Court in Lawrence,306 Justice Anthony Kennedy suggested that 
fundamental rights, or substantive due process rights, were not found just by looking at 
history and tradition, but that they could be discovered by reviewing more recent case law 
for an emerging awareness in the courts. In that vein, another way to understand what the 
Court has been doing in its immigration cases is to see it as gradually recognizing a quasi-
right to remain.  
Leading immigration scholar Hiroshi Motomura has argued that “phantom norms” 
have “produce[d] results that are much more sympathetic to aliens than the results that would 
follow from the interpretation” of the INA alone in recent immigration cases.307 He 
conceptualizes these phantom norms as having “enough gravitational force to exercise a pull 
on these other sources of law.”308 Professor Motomura traced a line of cases whose results, 
                                                           
302 Id. 
303 Id.  
304 Id.  
305 Writing the Court’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803), Justice John 
Marshall accepted Sir William Blackstone’s maxim that, “it is a general and indisputable rule, that where 
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.” See id. (showing Justice Marshall discussing that this 
maxim can be found on page twenty-three of the third volume of Sir William Blackstone’s commentaries). 
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“if the laws [were to] furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.” Id. I now contend, 
though, that the existence of a remedy hints that there is some right being protected.  
306 539 U.S. at 572.  
307 Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms 
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he argued, followed not from statutory interpretation or even the Court’s understanding of 
Congress’s plenary power309 on its own.310 He explained that a pattern emerged that first 
“allowed phantom constitutional norms to guide statutory interpretation by reading statutes 
in favor of aliens,” and second, “produced results that directly conflicted with those that the 
Court would have reached by applying the ‘real’ constitutional norms.”311 The right to 
remain is one of these phantom rights, and it formed through the combination of due process 
and stake theory—the understanding that “LPRs present for many years and with stronger 
ties to the United States are afforded [more] constitutional rights.”312 This Section will lay 
out how the Court has begun to utilize the previously unidentified right to remain in its cases 
that have restricted detention during and after removal proceedings, limited removal, and 
come close to recognizing deportation as punishment.  
1. Detention and Deprivation of Liberty 
The first shades of the right to remain have come from recent limitations courts have 
put on the detention removable LPRs may be subjected to during and after their removal 
proceedings. As mentioned above, in Zadvydas, the Court applied procedural due process 
protections to aliens caught up in deportation proceedings,313 but it continued to go to great 
lengths to deny an alien’s permanent detention. There, the Court consolidated two cases 
against aliens made removable for committing serious aggravated felonies, and even under 
these circumstances it held that INA § 241(a)(6)314—the post-removal detention statute—
did not authorize the attorney general to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the 
removal period.315 Writing for the Court, Justice Stephen Breyer “found nothing in the 
history of [Congress’s] statutes that clearly demonstrates a congressional intent to authorize 
indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention.”316 Instead, Breyer explained, “[f]reedom from 
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”317 Indefinite detention, 
then, could not be ordered unless it came from “a criminal proceeding with adequate 
procedural protections,” 318 or in “nonpunitive” and narrow circumstances where a special 
justification, like a harm-threatening mental illness, would outweigh the individual’s 
“constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.”319 The Zadvydas Court 
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312 Alyssa Markenson, Note, What’s at Stake?: Bluman v. Federal Election Commission and the 
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313 533 U.S. at 693. 
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315 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 
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considered a ninety-day removal period to be presumptively valid, and set six months as the 
appropriate limit before the Government would need to provide more evidence.320 
Then, in 2003, the Court in Demore v. Kim321 upheld INA § 236(c),322 a statute which 
imposed mandatory detention without bail for deportable criminal aliens, including those 
who committed an aggravated felony.323 The Court credited Congress’s “justifiabl[e] 
concern” that these aliens would continue engaging in crime and fail to appear for their 
removal hearings,324 and also acknowledged the proposition in Diaz,325 which allowed 
Congress to make rules for aliens that would not constitutionally apply to citizens. However, 
in his concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that even if an alien is given an initial 
hearing, his detention may still run against the Due Process Clause if “the continued detention 
became unreasonable or unjustified.”326 Resident aliens, thus, unquestionably enjoy due 
process protections. Justice Kennedy also opined that if there were to be an unreasonable 
delay by DHS in “pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become 
necessary then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect 
against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.”327  
Dissenting in the same case, Justice David Souter provided the loudest call for the 
right to remain by arguing that Mr. Kim could not be locked up without some kind of 
individualized hearing to determine the danger he posed to the community or as a flight 
risk.328 Souter grounded his argument in the belief that aliens have long had due process 
rights, and that constitutional protections are “particularly strong in the case of aliens 
lawfully admitted to permanent residence.”329 LPRs, like citizens, pay taxes, support the 
U.S. economy, serve in the military, and “contribute[] in myriad other ways to our 
society.”330 Finally, Justice Souter concluded that the law considers LPRs “to be at home 
in the United States, and even when the Government seeks removal, we have accorded 
LPRs greater protection than other aliens under the Due Process Clause.”331 
                                                           
320 Id. at 680. After six months, the alien would have “good reason to believe that there is no significant 
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” [and] “the Government must respond with 
evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at 701. 
321 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
322 Codified and referenced in the case as 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  
323 538 U.S. at 513. 
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325 426 U.S. 67. 
326 Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
327 Id. at 532–33. 
328 Id. at 541 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
329 Id. at 543. 
330 Id. at 544 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973)). 
331 Id. at 547 (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982)). 
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Appellate courts have weighed in as well, repeatedly warning that long-term civil 
detention is an issue. The Third Circuit,332 as well as the Sixth,333 First,334 and Eleventh335 
Circuits have all suggested a case-by-case approach to determine the reasonableness of an 
alien’s mandatory detention under INA § 236(c),336 a provision of the 1996 IIRIRA reforms 
that mandated detention for any removable alien for a CIMT or crime involving a 
controlled substance. In the Third Circuit case, Diop v. ICE/Homeland Security,337 the 
court held a criminal alien petitioner’s 1,072-day detention, justified by the government on 
the grounds that he was removable because of a CIMT, was unreasonable as applied and 
violated the Due Process Clause.338 Judge Julio M. Fuentes diligently retraced Diop’s 1,072 
days in custody, filled with occasional master calendar hearings, government-requested 
stays, and ineffective assistance of counsel until he was finally granted withholding of 
removal.339 “Diop’s prolonged detention,” Judge Fuentes concluded, “was certainly an 
injury in fact, caused by the Government.”340  
More recently, the Ninth341 and Second342 Circuits definitively ruled, as matters of 
first impression, that immigrants detained and awaiting removal proceedings pursuant to 
mandatory detention statutes must receive a bail hearing before an immigration judge 
within six months of their detention. Indeed, the Second Circuit explained that it “join[s] 
every other circuit that has considered this issue . . . in concluding that in order to avoid 
serious constitutional concerns, [the mandatory detention provision] must be read as 
including an implicit temporal limitation.343 Both decisions, which set a bright line at the 
six-month mark, grounded the impermissibility of indefinite detention in the due process 
rights afforded to all persons within the United States.344 
The Supreme Court is now poised to take this issue up again after the Ninth Circuit 
in 2015 held that aliens subject to prolonged detention required automatic, individualized 
bond hearings, and that IJs were required to consider the length of detention and afford 
                                                           
332 Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Reasonableness, by its very nature, is a 
fact-dependent inquiry requiring an assessment of all of the circumstances of any given case.”).  
333 Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 272–73 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding the reasonableness of detention under INA 
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334 Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 498 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding case-by-case reasonableness review of INA 
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335 Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1218 (11th Cir. 2016) (identifying factors to consider, 
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taken so long, whether removal will actually be practicable after the final order is given, whether the civil 
immigration detention exceeds the time the alien spent in criminal custody for the crime supporting his 
removal, and whether the civil detention facility is meaningfully different from a criminal penal 
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338 Id. at 234. 
339 Id. at 223–226. 
340 Id. at 227 (“[W]hen detention becomes unreasonable, the Due Process Clause demands a hearing, at 
which the Government bears the burden of proving that continued detention is necessary to fulfill the 
purposes of the detention statute.”). 
341 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). 
342 Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 614–15 (2d Cir. 2015). 
343 Id. at 614.  
344 Id. at 606; Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1138.  
 





aliens bond hearings every six months.345 The named plaintiff in the case, Alejandro 
Rodriguez, was brought to the United States by his parents when he was a year old and 
became an LPR at nine.346 Due to two convictions for joyriding (for which he served two 
years in prison) and misdemeanor drug possession, Rodriguez faced deportation in 2004 
and was subject to “mandatory detention” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), without any bond 
hearings.347 He waited in detention for three years without a hearing, lost his job, was 
separated from his two children, and was finally released and granted relief from 
deportation in 2007.348 The Court granted certiorari and heard arguments on November 20, 
2016, in Jennings v. Rodriguez,349 and then asked the parties to submit supplemental 
briefings on several issues: (1) whether aliens subject to mandatory detention under 
immigration law350 must receive bond hearings with a real possibility of release if their 
detention lasts six months, and also what level of proof the government must provide to 
warrant further detention,351 (2) what factors may be considered on the alien’s behalf,352 
and (3) whether new bond hearings must be offered to the alien every six months.353 
These limits on detention get us part of the way down the path to the right to remain, 
but the other half of support comes from a line of cases that have, at times, precluded 
resident alien removals entirely. 
2. Limits on Removal, and Deportation as Punishment? 
Hints of this right have also been seen in the Supreme Court’s legal reasoning for at 
least the last sixty years, as it has outright overturned the removal of LPRs in certain 
situations. In 1953, the Court overturned the indefinite detention of Mr. Chew, a Chinese-
born LPR who traveled on an American vessel to the Far East.354 He was barred from re-
entering the United States when the ship returned.355 The Court, engaging in some legal 
fiction writing, assimilated Chew to the status of an LPR who never left the United States, 
and held that because Chew never took shore leave or left his ship, this was a removal rather 
than exclusion issue.356 The Court appeared to recast the facts in this way because removing 
Chew seemed unfair, but it did not yet have the tools to make more than a territorial 
argument. Thus, the Court reasoned an LPR who remains physically present would at least 
retain Fifth Amendment procedural protections, and could only be deported after receiving 
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a chance to be heard.357 In Rosenberg v. Fleuti,358 the Court held that its decision in Chew 
recognized the due process rights of a resident alien who returned from a brief trip abroad.359 
Under what became known as the “Fleuti doctrine,” LPRs “were not regarded as making an 
‘entry’ into the United States” for immigration purposes after they returned from “brief, 
casual, and innocent” trips abroad.360 As a result, LPRs were able to briefly travel abroad and 
return to the United States without facing the exclusion rules then in force, as long as their 
absences were not “meaningfully interruptive” of their LPR status.361  
More concretely recently, in Landon v. Plasencia,362 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
writing for the Court, concluded that once an alien gains admission and “begins to develop 
the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.”363 
At first, O’Connor reiterated that since Chew, the Court “developed the rule that a 
continuously present permanent resident alien has a right to due process in such a situation” 
as exclusion upon re-entry, whereas a non-LPR or noncontinuously-present alien would 
not have such due process rights.364 However, moving beyond a physical presence 
argument, O’Connor guided future decision makers to weigh the interests at stake for 
resident aliens and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures 
used by immigration authorities, and balance these against the interest of the government 
in continuing to use its current procedures.365 
The balance tips toward further due process protections if one accepts that removal 
is a kind of punishment. Professor Jason Stanley effectively explains the historical context 
and social stakes of deportation, writing, “[e]xile from one’s home is historically 
considered one of the worst punishments the state could employ; it was, after all, one of 
the traditional Greek and Roman punishments for murder, their alternative to the death 
penalty.”366 And although courts have not explicitly held that yet, several decisions have 
come quite close.367 This notion, once more, goes back to Justice Brewer’s dissent in Fong 
Yue Ting, where he wrote: “Deportation is punishment. It involves—[f]irst, an arrest, a 
deprival of liberty; and, second, a removal from home, from family, from business, from 
property.”368 Also in dissent in that same case, Justice Field agreed and argued that this 
punishment was “beyond all reason in its severity” and “out of all proportion to the alleged 
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offense.”369 Field continued that, “as to its cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible 
deportation from a country of one’s residence, and the breaking up of all the relations of 
friendship, family, and business there contracted.”370 A half century later, in Bridges v. 
Wixon,371 the Court explained that when “the liberty of an individual is at stake,” the fact 
“[t]hat deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”372 This 
consideration of deportation as a penalty inched quite close to labeling it as punishment. 
And two decades later, the Court held Congress lacked the power to expatriate citizens—
to revoke their U.S. citizenship—against their will as punishment.373 In practice, 
deportation and forcible expatriation achieve the same ends, yet one is available to the 
government and the other is not. 
The Court’s gradual recognition of deportation as punishment may, at first, be seen as 
an alternate explanation for its various seemingly conflicting decisions. That argument would 
contend that rather than the right to remain, what is driving the Court’s jurisprudence is the 
realization that deportation is a tremendous cost to exact from LPRs, so there must be more 
protection to prevent this exaction unless it is absolutely warranted. However, deportation 
becomes only a stronger punishment the longer an LPR has been in the United States. Thus, 
the recognition that deportation may, in fact, be punishment flows smoothly alongside the 
right to remain. The consequences of deportation become more pronounced and egregious 
as the individual’s claim to a right to remain grows on the other side of the balance. 
The most recent Supreme Court case on the matter was Padilla v. Kentucky.374 There, 
the Court admitted that it has long believed that “deportation is a particularly severe 
‘penalty,’”375 and that a removal order is more burdensome than many civil or criminal 
sanctions.376 In doing so, the Court acknowledged the argument made in dissent by the 
Sixth Circuit thirty-seven years earlier; that removal is tremendously jeopardizing to an 
alien’s basic right to person liberty.377 In Aguilera-Enriquez v. Immigration and 
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Naturalization Services,378 Judge Robert E. DeMascio, sitting by designation to the Sixth 
Circuit, concluded that because he considered removal to be punishment, counsel must be 
guaranteed for the proceeding to be fundamentally fair.379 Other criminal procedure 
safeguards would also have to be provided to aliens facing removal, including Miranda 
warnings prior to interrogation, the right to a speedy trial, full Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule protections, a comprehensive discovery process, and prohibitions on 
cruel and unusual punishment.380 Currently, LPRs receive none of these protections, while 
citizens, who may have been arrested for more severe crimes, claim these defenses as a 
matter of course. Recognizing a right to remain would give LPRs a stronger foundation 
from which to demand more important and just procedural guards. Under the status quo, 
however, withholding these protections only contributes to the unjust gap in our treatment 
of LPRs—we have made them more removable, it is taking longer to remove them, but 
when facing this “particularly severe penalty”381 we give them shockingly little process.  
 More recently, in 2016, the Third Circuit reaffirmed that aliens seeking initial 
admission to the United States were merely requesting a privilege and had no constitutional 
rights in their applications.382 The Court, however, explicitly noted that this class of 
plaintiffs—“aliens seeking initial admission”—were distinctly different from LPRs, “a 
category of aliens (unlike recent clandestine entrants) whose entitlement to broad 
constitutional protections is undisputed.”383 The case remains on a cert petition to the 
Supreme Court. 
3. Acceptance of Laches and Other Equitable Relief as Emerging Consensus 
Various courts’ willingness to entertain laches defenses against the federal 
government in removal actions may also be seen as evidence of a latent right to remain. 
First in 1999, the Seventh Circuit found an alien stated a substantial due process claim 
where the INS filed an Order to Show Cause in 1992, but then “drag[ged] its feet,” despite 
the alien’s continued pleas for a hearing, until 1996, by which point the AEDPA reforms 
had eliminated his ability to seek 212(c) discretionary relief.384 Then, in 2004, the Second 
Circuit refused to rule out a laches defense that satisfied the doctrine’s necessary elements, 
although it ultimately upheld the removal of an LPR convicted of an aggravated felony.385 
By noting that this particular petitioner did not properly argue “the government’s conduct 
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rose to the level of a due process violation,”386 the court appeared to lay out a roadmap to 
success for a future claimant. In 2010, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a BIA ruling against a 
resident alien’s laches defense, but they did so because the petitioner “point[ed] to no 
evidence demonstrating affirmative misconduct on the part of the government,” and thus, 
“because equitable estoppel is not available to [petitioner], laches is not available to him 
either.”387 And once more, in Haddad v. United States,388 the Sixth Circuit held laches may 
be available to otherwise-removable LPRs if it was properly proven—by showing a lack 
of diligence by the federal government and resulting prejudice to the defendant.389 
Interestingly, in its decision in Thom v. Ashcroft,390 the Second Circuit noted in a 
footnote that “[i]n contrast with the various decisions on laches, it seems settled that the 
government may, in the appropriate circumstances, be equitably estopped in the 
immigration context,” and proceeded to cite previous cases going back to 1976.391 Those 
circumstances exist when the alien could show “affirmative misconduct” by the 
government.392 For instance, in Mauting v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,393 the 
Ninth Circuit held that the petitioner aliens brought a colorable claim of equitable estoppel 
against the INS by alleging, with documentary support, that the INS deliberately delayed 
processing an adjustment of status petition until just before the petitioner aged out of 
eligibility for the provision.394 Overall, along with this potential for estoppel, there is a 
reason courts around the country are reluctant to rule out the laches defense for LPRs—an 
emerging consensus that there are limits on the government’s removal powers. Those 
limits, the “remedy” as Justice Marshall would understand it, are only made necessary 
because there is a right to remain. 
C. A Right to Remain from History and Tradition 
The newer theory of finding substantive due process rights from an emerging 
awareness among lower federal courts has made certain members of the Court uneasy.395 
Rather, in Washington v. Glucksberg,396 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist observed, “the 
[Due Process] Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, 
objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”397 The lawful permanent 
resident’s right to remain is also grounded in our shared history and tradition, if you take a 
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holistic view of the history of United States immigration policy, and also recognizes some 
important limitations of current proposed reforms.  
 Although the nation’s current immigration policies are quite restrictive, the United 
States was founded with relatively free and inclusive immigration policies throughout the 
18th and 19th centuries.398 The Naturalization Act of 1790 simply required two-years of 
residency for aliens, although it limited citizenship to a “free white person” who possessed 
“good moral character.”399 It was replaced by the Naturalization Act of 1798, which 
permitted President John Adams to deport foreigners he considered dangerous400 and 
bumped the residency requirement up to fourteen years to limit voters for the Republican 
Party, but the Act of 1798 was, itself, revised by the Jefferson Administration just four 
years later to lower the residency requirement to five years.401 The nation remained largely 
open-border until the 1880s when, as more immigrants arrived and economic conditions 
worsened, Congress passed the first immigration legislation aimed at exclusion.402 At the 
same time, though, the United States still solicited European immigrants.403 Finally, until 
1926, resident aliens were still able to vote in many local and state elections.404 An LPR’s 
right to exist and participate in the United States, from the days of the revolution and 
through the Civil War, was accepted and praised, as that meant the resident was 
assimilating to American culture.405 The INA’s formal exclusion and removal grounds 
were only instituted in 1952,406 and the widespread growth of removal grounds is an even 
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newer phenomenon that was accelerated by the AEDPA and IIRIRA reforms.407 Thus, 
reviewing America’s long-term immigration history and traditions shows there is a place 
for the right to remain. 
 Furthermore, the understanding that LPRs have different and deeper rights than 
other non-citizens even appears to be shared by the Trump administration, which has begun 
shaping what appears to be the harshest immigration policy this nation has seen since the 
days of the Chinese Exclusion Acts. Shortly after President Trump issued his January 27, 
2017 Executive Order (EO), which barred individuals from seven Muslim-majority nations 
from entering the United States, DHS announced the EO did not apply to LPRs, and that 
their entry “is in the national interest.”408 DHS followed this up with a statement 
announcing, “absent significant derogatory information indicating a serious threat to public 
safety and welfare, lawful permanent status will be a dispositive factor in our case-by-case 
determinations.”409 Even under the Trump administration’s more hostile and restrictive 
immigration policies, LPRs retain a special and preferred status.410  
D. Implications of a Right to Remain 
Further determining the precise contours and limits of the right to remain should be 
a goal of immigration academics and future litigation. We do not yet know when it would 
attach, and whether it could or should apply beyond LPRs. However, beginning to 
recognize a right to remain for long-term LPRs would have several important and just 
implications. First, it would provide important predictability and equality in how 
immigration cases are decided throughout the country. As Professor Motomura observed, 
current ad hoc judicial efforts “might suffice to prevent injustice in a particular case but do 
little to find a coherent and fully satisfactory solution if the particular injustice is merely 
symptomatic of a more fundamental problem that is rooted in the alien’s inability . . . to 
raise a constitutional claim directly.”411 Rather than requiring the LPR to depend on the 
mercy of discretion shown by individual immigration officers, a judicially-recognized right 
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to remain would guard against abuses of the LPR by the federal government (and also state 
governments through increased access to habeas corpus protections) because it gives an 
LPR standing and legitimacy before a court which cannot be bought or bargained for. 
Indeed, as Motomura hopes, judges, armed with the LPR’s right to remain, “should find 
that they do not need to grope for . . . awkward and unpredictable subconstitutional solutions.”412 
Second, the right to remain would strengthen the ability of LPRs to participate in, 
contribute to, and entrench themselves and their families within their communities. It 
would result in a positive feedback loop whereby individuals granted more rights would 
now have the incentive and, more importantly, the opportunity to act on these rights. LPRs 
would have a stable foundation to take economic risks, speak out against perceived 
injustices, and contribute to strengthening the societies they are a part of. Without the 
specter of removal hanging over their heads, LPR families—matriarchs and patriarchs, 
especially—could feel confident in investing in their neighborhoods.  
Third, recognition of this right would protect LPRs from being taken advantage of at 
their places of business and in the education system. Again, without the endless threat of 
removal, LPRs have more bargaining power and options they can turn to, which makes 
under-the-table or illegal alternatives much less attractive or necessary. Fourth, a 
recognized right to remain could, in time, naturally stem illegal immigration because it 
only makes legal immigration a more attractive and stable alternative.  
Finally, a firmly entrenched right to remain, and limit on LPR removals, would 
decrease the catastrophic impact that removals have on families. In 2010, the Urban 
Institute sampled six study sites throughout the country and examined the consequences of 
LPR parental arrest, detention, and deportation on 190 children in eigty-five families.413 
Their study found that children in families who had one or more parent arrested and/or 
subsequently detained or deported “experienced severe challenges” that “contributed to 
adverse behavioral changes.”414 Many families experienced housing instability415 and food 
insufficiency,416 and children suffered in school, either as a result of disruptions in 
attendance, or because they were unable to adjust to losing one or both of their parents.417 
Stability for individuals and their families is extremely valuable.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Forty-two years after he immigrated to the United States, and thirty-two years after 
his conviction for statutory rape, U.S. Navy veteran Hilario Rivas-Melendrez was deported 
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to Mexico in 2012.418 Though the Seventh Circuit hoped he could acquire discretionary 
relief, he was sent away from his family, friends, and livelihood because of the ultimately 
unforgiving definition of an aggravated felony in the INA. 
The application of laches against the federal government, to prohibit the government 
from initiating or completing removal proceedings against lawful permanent residents a 
significant number of years after they have served their sentences, finds justification in the 
common law understanding of laches and in the historical and precedential way laches have 
been applied against the federal government. Bundled together, these concepts are 
compelling enough to limit sovereign power in this unique space in immigration. 
Laches is only a partial solution, however. It guards against long-delayed removal 
actions, but not against the wild expansion of removable offenses in the first place. Instead, 
a novel way of re-reading Supreme Court and Appellate Courts’ precedent suggests there 
is something more that the common law, the Constitution, and courts are actually protecting 
here. That force is a substantive due process right to remain that lawful permanent residents 
acquire as they spend more time in the United States, and it grows, and ought to grow, as 
they remain peaceful and productive neighbors and members of our communities. The right 
to remain has driven the Court to push for more prosecutorial and judicial discretion in 
favor of LPRs contesting long-distant immigration violations, and it has motivated the 
Court’s immigration due process jurisprudence to create results, or at least to contemplate 
decisions, that cannot result from bare interpretation of the INA on its own.  
This right to remain should be recognized outright by the Court and then, hopefully, 
as part of comprehensive congressional immigration reform. Only then can policymakers 
and the Court begin to properly understand, triage, and remedy deficiencies in our 
immigration system. However, as evidenced above, the right to remain may not yet be 
completely accepted and is not fully defined, so this Article calls on scholars in the field to 
embark on a mission to help refine and codify it. More importantly, it calls on legal 
practitioners to demand from the courts the recognition of the right to remain—to test it, 
earn it, and continue to develop it. What is clear, now, is that without a right to remain, all 
lawful permanent residents experience de facto conditional LPR status. A right to remain 
would alleviate the pressure to live a completely mistake-free life, an expectation the U.S. 
government does not burden any of its own citizens with. At the same time, the newly 
recognized right would not force the LPR to become a U.S. citizen, and potentially have to 
give up citizenship elsewhere. It would give lawful LPRs like Mr. Rivas-Melendrez a 
sound hook to contest their removal proceedings after they have served their lawfully 
imposed sentences and proven themselves to be rehabilitated. The right to remain would 
recognize that LPRs, like citizens, have the capacity to rehabilitate themselves after making 
mistakes, and it would provide much-needed stability to LPRs’ lives, which could yield 
positive results for everyone in the country–citizens and non-citizens alike. 
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